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# THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

MAY, 1954

## THE BUDGET

**M**R. BUTLER'S third Budget has been described by some as disappointing. Others have said that it was courageous, for he did nothing to seek popularity or votes. Disappointment can only have been felt by those who have not followed the course of our recent economic history and the facts disclosed by the publication of Estimates and the Economic Survey. If, however, the critics had turned their minds back to the emergency measures of 1951 and the Budget of 1952, a feeling of relief would have been more natural than disappointment. The fact is that the Chancellor had no scope or power in the present position of our financial affairs to take any important steps to bring relief and help to any of the urgent cases requiring help without incurring serious risks which he did not feel able to face.

The Budget this year is consequently little more than a survey of our national accounts, but it nevertheless discloses the depressing fact that in a year of prosperity, full-employment and high consumption, and after meeting the taxation relief which was granted last year, there is practically nothing left over to lighten the present burden of taxation or to deal with the inescapable demands for further expenditure from the Social Services, housing, transport, the state monopolies and other sections of our domestic economy.

It may be that a depressing Budget might prove to be the salvation of our economy if it brought home to the nation that there are no dodges or manoeuvres which can ease taxation and enable us to meet our social and economic liabilities. At present our affairs, in spite of everything that has been accomplished, are still precarious, and it is only by a national effort and a full realisation that to take more out of our national product that we put in is really the cause of inflation, and inflicts injury upon all, especially the Old Age Pensioners and those living on fixed incomes.

Our economic history since the war has been one of recurring crises, and though considerable improvement has been achieved it is not impossible that through circumstances, some of which are beyond our control, a third crisis might arise. If we turn back to Mr. Butler's Budget of 1952 and note what has happened since, there is cause for much satisfaction. Industrial production has recovered from the set-back of 1952 and is still rising. The home market has absorbed a considerable proportion of the output and personal savings have shown a tendency to increase. In general, and partly because of good fortune in terms of our trade, the object which the Chancellor sought to achieve last year has been carried out; but as a result of the increase in consumption and high costs, the improvement in the amount of investment in private manufacturing industry has been very small. Investment in new and up-to-date machinery has fallen far behind the U.S.A. and in all

probability Germany is now spending more than we are. In these circumstances the Chancellor of the Exchequer has acted wisely in the new proposals for the relief of taxation of investment in industry, though it is doubtful how far they will create increased incentive and production. The necessity for this relief is due to the crushing burden of taxation, the high price of materials, and had it been possible for the Chancellor to reduce taxation, such measures would not have been required. They will undoubtedly be a help, but taxation and shortage of capital are not the only obstacles to development and extension. In some cases adequate capital is available, but with prices at the present level it is not possible to establish new plant at terms which will enable goods to be made and exported at competitive prices, or to compete at home with industries whose plant was set up before the rise in costs and has since been written off. In some cases the cost of machines is such that they can only be run economically on a double shift, and trade union restrictions do not always allow this to be done. There have been cases in which new machinery has not been installed because trade union procedure would not allow it to be worked sufficiently fast to enable it to be used on a competitive basis so that expenditure could be written off in 15 years. There is an element of speculation in the Chancellor's new proposals, for in the event of a further increase of inflation and higher prices the value of the concessions which have been made in this field would be wiped out.

There is a marked improvement in our exports—though the latest reports are not so encouraging—it is, however, clear that we are still spending up to the limit of our income and we are unable to make additions to our reserves which are necessary in order to be in a position to withstand any shock to our international trade. The outlook for our international trade and balance of payments in spite of all that has happened since the disaster of 1951-2 is still insecure, and the Chancellor wisely announced his intention of taking special measures in the autumn if necessity should arise. Any further decline in American business (a matter on which few observers feel able to speak with any certainty) might have serious consequences, as would a further increase in inflation through wage increases at a time when inflation has ceased in Germany and in Japan. In the event of further wage claims raising the cost of exports in six months' time, and the balance of trade being disturbed again, it may happen that we have not finally escaped from the series of dollar crises. It is this grim possibility that doubtless led the Chancellor to state in the Budget speech "The hard truth is that, much as we want greater relief of taxation, even our present high rates will not save us from a serious threat to the balance of future Budgets if the growth of expenditure is not controlled", and later "We are near the point—and in some cases we may have passed it—where further increases in wages and profit margins will price us out of our export markets. All round increases in wages have clearly played a large part in the upward movement of prices since 1945. Both stability at home and competitive power abroad require that wage increases should not outrun productivity: any improvement in productivity should show itself also in the form of lower prices".

The Budget does not contain any direct incentive to the individual, but it would appear that something more enduring than small tax con-



cessions is necessary if we are to make a further national effort which will enable us to meet our growing liabilities, dispense with help from America and give adequate capital assistance to the Dominions and Colonies. As a first step towards this end Governments must realise that we will only be rewarded by success when we make a new approach to our problems of production. The great issue, although vast experiments in state monopoly have been made in this and other countries in this scientific and technical age, is how industry can be made to work in a humane and efficient manner. We must abandon the obsolete idea that there are two sides in industry whose interests are incompatible. We must bring about an industrial outlook in which all are working in a common interest for the good of the nation.

Public interest in our national finances is generally concentrated in the few weeks before and after the introduction of the Budget. But if we are to understand the need for a greater and continuing effort to maintain our present standard of living and to cope with unavoidable increases in expenditure, an effort should be made to determine what our future needs will be in order that we can endeavour to meet them, or if they are beyond our resources (as they are today) which we feel should take priority. In a recent debate in the House of Lords it was suggested that there should be an enquiry into our expenditure on defence, which this year, including American Aid, amounts to £16,039 millions; the largest figure in time of peace. This proposal was not adopted, for sufficient reason, but there is a much stronger case for an investigation of our anticipated needs apart from defence. Such a picture would help to produce a change in our attitude towards production. It might lead trade unionists to adopt a similar attitude to production as that of the American unions, which, while driving a hard bargain on wages, will not tolerate any restriction in output, with the result that wages and output in America are higher than they are here. It is the duty of a Government which claims to be democratic and to draw its authority from the wishes of the people to see that the people are fully informed as to the size and nature of the problems which face the country and also have access to the known facts about the problems and any proposals for their solution.

There is to-day one problem above all others which should be the subject of everybody's earnest thought, especially those under thirty, namely the inadequacy of pensions and benefits under National Insurance, and how a rapidly increasing number of old people are to be supported. Owing to inflation and the rise in the cost of living since the scheme was introduced in 1948 there are now 1½ million people who find the National Insurance benefits are inadequate and are obliged to appeal to the National Assistance Board. This problem may be dealt with by Government when it receives (it is to be hoped in the near future) the Report of the Government Actuary for the period July, 1948 to March, 1954. The responsibility of the Actuary is to report on the state of the fund and adequacy of the contributions to maintain the benefits. The Report will show that the fund will be quite unable to meet the benefits at their present level. The duty of the Government is quite different. The Minister is required by the National Insurance Act to review the situation in relation to the circumstances of the time, including especially

the expenditure necessary to preserve good health and working capacity of the beneficiaries and take into account any changes since the rates were fixed or any which may be contemplated. The progressive burden of the increase in providing for the ageing population is serious and leads us to consideration of the further problem of the taxation arrangements affecting superannuation funds. As long ago as August 1950 Sir Stafford Cripps appointed a committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Millard Tucker, Q.C., to examine the taxation treatment of pension for retirement. The Report of this committee has been presented to the Government and estimates of the costs of their proposals have been submitted to the Committee by the Revenue and amount in all to 72 millions. A formidable sum although it does not represent the net cost to the community. The tax treatment of pension schemes both public and private for the benefit of employees, for private life insurance and for annuity purchase out of capital has long been chaotic, and if the proposals of this able committee after 3½ years' work are adopted order and justice will be brought into this important field of saving for investment.

The Government acted wisely in view of the gravity of this question in appointing in July 1953 a committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Thomas Phillips to consider the economic and financial problems for provision for old age. It is to be hoped that this committee will include in its enquiry and report a full consideration of superannuation and insurance schemes covered by the Tucker Committee. There are some 8,000 such schemes which in 1952 were estimated to have an annual income of 70 millions and total assets of 700 millions. This and other important matters such as the American economy were doubtless much in the mind of Mr. Butler when he decided that he could do nothing now to meet the wish of the people that at long last justice should be done to Old Age Pensioners whose claims and hardships have been ignored while strongly organised sections of the community have been able to obtain an undue proportion of the national resources. In a year when the estimates for Civil Government expenditure have increased by 238 millions, when our national income will have to carry a larger proportion of the concessions made in last year's Budget, and defence expenditure is at record level, Mr. Butler has produced a Budget which is honest and as safe as possible.

H. GRAHAM WHITE.

## ITALY'S SUCCESSES AND WORRIES

**I**TALY'S political crisis, which has now lasted for many months, seems to attract a great deal of international publicity. So did the Trieste affair last November. But what seldom receives any attention at all is her remarkable record of economic reconstruction and consolidation achieved since the end of the war. This record would be impressive enough if performed in favourable circumstances or against a background of solid economic wealth and moral health. But in Italy the very reverse has been true, which makes the achievement even more outstanding.

There have been three stages in economic reconstruction. First, in the years 1945-47, there came the fight against hunger and general paralysis. Then, in 1947-50, there followed a period when monetary and financial stability was achieved, while production was resumed and expanded. Finally there came the third stage in 1950-52—which is far from complete yet—when it became possible for the Government to take up a struggle against structural difficulties, while at the same time having to develop production and employment and also rebuild a constantly growing economic and political co-operation between Italy and other democratic countries.

The restoration of law and order, of the State's authority and of the fundamental framework of society, has been relatively painless and quick. There has been a rapid fall in juvenile delinquency, while more marriages and better education are another happy sign of improved conditions. The nutritional standards of Italy are still low compared to those of most other European countries, but they are getting better. Food is abundant; so, once again, is wine—despite all the destroyed vineyards. Money is stable and its purchasing power is strong. The shops are full. So are the restaurants. The building industry is booming, and, in addition to the staggering amount of reconstruction work already completed, there are huge new housing developments in all the major cities. With a few spectacular exceptions, industry is doing well. Inland transport not merely operates once more at full strength, but has been improved beyond belief. The merchant marine, which before the war aggregated just over 3 million tons and in 1945 stood at less than one half of this figure, has passed the 3.5 million tons mark in 1952. A liberal economic policy, inspired by the wisdom of President Einaudi and ably applied in practice by the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Donato Menichella, and—as long as he was Minister both of the Treasury and Finance—ex-Premier Giuseppe Pella, has produced admirable results.

The general index of industrial production (taking 1938 as 100) is now well over 150, while in many industries—especially chemicals, electric power and wool—it is nearer the 200 mark. Most spectacular of all is the development of the methane gas industry which is rapidly revolutionising the very foundations on which the Italian economy is built. Methane is now Italy's foremost mineral product. Jumping in a minimum of time from small beginnings to an annual output of some two thousand million cubic metres, this natural gas industry is still only in its early stages of development. Estimated production can be raised to twelve million cubic metres a day without endangering the apparently inexhaustible supplies which are found in different parts of the country, with large concentrations in the Po Valley and in Southern Italy. Such an output would be equivalent to eighteen thousand tons of coal or twelve thousand tons of oil a day and would cover about two-thirds of the country's total annual requirements in costly coal or the whole of the oil imports. Even now the present production is the equivalent of two colliers or oil tankers a day. All this not only means a tremendous saving of foreign currency, but a firm foundation for further profitable industrialisation as well. The most important use of methane gas, which is 30 per cent. to 50 per cent. cheaper than imported fuel, is for heating purposes in industry, in transport and

even in domestic consumption. But it can also serve an infinite variety of purposes in the chemical, steel and other industries. Of the total output, 95 per cent. is sold to consumers through a national corporation by means of a network of methanoducts, while the rest is compressed in containers which can be distributed anywhere. Italy now has over three thousand miles of these methane pipelines—or "metanodotti"—and new ones are constantly being established. Not through any compulsion, but of their own free will and for reasons of economy and efficiency, all the leading industrial firms are now using this fuel in ever increasing quantities. Many of them are getting together in groups for the joint construction of further "metanodotti".

Not less far reaching are the structural changes which are being achieved through the land reform and the development—through the CASSA per il MEZZOGIORNO (Fund for Southern Italy)—of the hitherto poor and backward Southern regions. These are costly and extremely complicated projects, but the results already achieved are there for anyone to see and are most encouraging. The land reform, which is not completed yet and which involves the expropriation (for compensation of course) of two and a half million acres of land and its division amongst about 100,000 families, also means the creation of a wholly modern sector of agriculture with a consequent large increase in production from the first year. This, however, necessitates a huge outlay of State funds not only to pay for the land itself, but for the purchase of equipment (by far the largest item, including vast quantities of tractors), new housing, livestock, roads, land conversion, irrigation and a variety of other purposes, such as the creation of village centres for the scattered farm population. The impact of these developments on the production of agricultural machinery or of household goods of every kind cannot be underestimated. Nor should a great constructive effort of this kind be ignored when assessing the social welfare activities of the Italian State and communities, on which some 220 thousand million lire have been spent between 1949 and 1952.

In a country which is traditionally poor in capital it is not easy to raise enough money for investment on this scale. Moreover, in addition to new development there still is an almost inexhaustible need of funds for reconstruction; for urgent repair and relief after such annually recurring calamities as floods, volcano eruptions, etc.; for the resettlement of refugees from lost territories; for unemployment relief and emigration; and, more recently, also for rearmament. In the spring of 1953, when Pella was still Minister of the Treasury he estimated Italy's national income at ten thousand times one thousand million lire—ten thousand milliards or, in American usage, ten thousand billion—a modest figure for a European nation of 47 million people. About 79 per cent. of the national income was spent on consumption he stated, and 21 per cent. on investments. These figures are eloquent enough and illustrate the supreme effort required to maintain or even expand Italy's economy. The standard of living is slowly rising. Real wages are higher; individual spending on food and clothes and even entertainment is constantly on the upgrade. There is still much poverty around, but nobody is starving and even among the two million "permanently unemployed"—with a population of 47 million, Italy has a labour force of twenty million men

and women, but enough work for only eighteen million—almost everybody is earning a little money one way or another.

There have been some unexpectedly beneficial developments, like a bumper harvest in 1953—this diminishes the need of wheat and cattle fodder imports—and the tourist season has been amazingly good. Some seven million foreigners visited Italy in 1953, spending about two hundred and fifty million dollars in the process. Not only such familiar landmarks as Rome, Venice and Florence are attracting the tourists, but the great Italian spas, like Fuggi, St. Pellegrino, Montecatini, Merano and Abano—are rapidly regaining or acquiring world renown. Foreign visitors find Italian prices reasonable and service far better than in most other countries. Currency is stable. The days of a black market rate, even for dollars or Swiss francs, are gone. The official dollar rate is 624.90 lire to the dollar, but most banks or other money changers actually pay a fraction less—about 621—instead of paying more, as used to be the case. So much for the brighter side of the economic picture.

On its darker side are not only the old endemic weaknesses, like overpopulation, with consequent unemployment, budgetary deficits and an adverse balance of payments, but also all the new international complications. Foreign trade is out of gear, since there has been a considerable rise in imports and only a small increase in exports. The textile industry, which in days gone by used to be one of the principal yardsticks for measuring Italy's economic conditions, has lost its preponderant position as compared with some of the newer industries. But it still plays a vital part, and while it has been pushed out of some of its traditional foreign markets it has greatly benefited from increased domestic demand. The spectacular rise in the importation of coffee, sugar and petrol for automobiles and scooters is a further proof of the improved standard of living. Italy's production of motor cars and motor scooters is constantly growing and now constitutes a vital group among the exporting industries. The economy, though faced with many international and domestic uncertainties, is not threatened by any immediate dangers. With good luck and under the present competent management, its consolidation and even expansion could be carried on in a reasonably satisfactory way.

Italy's real dangers are political and social. Here it must be said that the picture is anything but rosy. The country's social peace is threatened from every side. Both the Communists and the Fascists—who have recently reappeared on the scene—find a happy hunting ground not only among the frustrated unemployed but also among the workers of the industrial North. Men in large factories are easy to organise. Moreover, they have many grievances—some legitimate, some not. Italy has some admirable employers like, for instance, Dr. Angelo Costa, the present President of the powerful "Confindustria" (Federation of Industries). But she also has plenty of industrialists who are totally devoid of any sense of civic duty and who choose to live like oriental potentates among the poor and exacerbated masses. Feelings are running very high. There is also an old and vexatious feud between the major labour organizations and the employers about the question of wages and the wage structure itself. There was a 24-hours' strike by some 3.5 million workers on September 24th which was intended as a warning. A similar 24-hours'



strike, involving 4 million workers took place on December 15th, while about 1 million Government employees, including railway and postal workers, struck on December 11th. An average workman now earns about 31 thousand lire a month. But only one quarter of this is his basic wage; the rest is made up of allowances of various kinds and cost of living bonuses. The labour organisations want the 31 thousand total to be made the fundamental wage; if that were accepted, overtime work and other extras would have to be calculated on a basis four times the size of the present one. The Confindustria replies that this would increase the cost of labour by ten per cent. and that industry cannot afford it. Indeed, it argues that such a measure would necessitate the dismissal of redundant workers and even lead to the closing down of certain factories. But this is precisely where labour's other claims come in, namely a demand for protection against dismissals, a guarantee of steady employment, and all-round wage increases, quite apart from the basic adjustment. The Confindustria is willing to recognise that in certain specific industries a rise in wages would be justified, but it firmly declines to accept all these global claims. It would not be surprising, therefore, if in the course of 1954 there were to be some kind of show-down, and both sides assert they are ready for it.

As to politics the elections of June 7th, 1953, have left the Democrazia Christiana the largest party in the country, but its position is much weakened. The nation is traditionally anticlerical and resents the excessive intervention of the Church in politics. Under de Gasperi's leadership, and with the Vatican's support, the Democrazia Christiana managed to collect just under 11 million votes. The Communists and Nenni Socialists polled slightly over 10 million votes. It would not require much effort, therefore, for the Left Wing Extremists to obtain a majority or at least to become the largest Parliamentary group with some 45 per cent. of all seats. On the extreme Right, the Fascists and the Monarchists, who were amnestied by de Gasperi much too soon, have re-emerged in great strength—with some 3½ million votes. The small Centre parties, which were in the de Gasperi coalition, and which are now once again participating in a precarious coalition Government under the Christian Democrat, Mario Scelba, have suffered a terrible setback. Stable government is impossible with the present composition of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. To all these complications must be added yet another one. The fact has now been established that the majority of the 1,300,000 votes which were in dispute in the June 7th election was cast in favour of de Gasperi's coalition. Nobody knows whether some seventy Communists and their Nenni sympathisers, or the Right wing deputies who got in thanks to this mistake, are entitled to sit in the Chamber or not. It would be impossible to throw them out and to determine by whom they should be replaced. A new election might produce even more adverse results.

De Gasperi's own position is not quite clear. Had the true election results been known at the time, perhaps he would not have resigned. When I had the privilege of spending a few hours with him at his residence in Castel Gandolfo some time ago, I did not get the impression that he was eager to return to power too soon. His well-known Western orien-



tation, his support of a United Europe plan and of the European Defence Community are not popular in Italy at the moment. Nor was his personal entourage, though his own austere integrity commands great respect. He is recognised even by his enemies as Italy's leading statesman. Next year the question of a successor to President Einaudi—who is 80—will have to be decided. Perhaps de Gasperi is the right man for the job.

Meanwhile the political situation remains explosive. The Trieste affair has played straight into the hands of the Fascists and the Communists alike. Both extremist wings can point to the fact that the West seems afraid of, and full of deference to, dictators, while treating a democracy with contempt. For their part, progressive people in Italy were horrified at the ease with which the Allies shot at Italians; nowadays, white people hesitate to shoot at natives, but in this case they seemed to have no compunction about firing on their fellow white-men. Granted that Rome's attitude, especially in its anti-British outburst, was outrageous; granted that the strong undercurrent of Fascist rancour, dating from the days of the Abyssinian war, and directed against Eden personally, was as foolish as it was unjustified, the fact remains that the Americans and the British handled the whole business with absolutely staggering ineptitude. Anti-British and anti-American feeling is strong; it is being fanned by both Right-wing and Left-wing extremists, feeding on everything and anything—however trivial or untrue.

As if all these difficulties were not more than enough for the courageous Prime Minister, Mario Scelba, (who, on February 10th, 1954, succeeded in forming a Government, thus following Amintore Fanfani, who lasted eleven days, and Giuseppe Pella, who lasted nearly four months), an absurd sex-and-drugs-and-corruption scandal has greatly added to his worries. The least interesting character in the Montesi affair is the wretched young Wilma Montesi herself, who was found dead on a beach near Rome a long time ago and who was largely forgotten until the recent outburst of malodorous sensations. The accusations which have been made in and out of Court by a number of witnesses involve so many people of high rank and reveal such an unhealthy state of affairs that the political consequences of the scandal are quite considerable. For the Communists and the Fascists this is an unexpected boon; for the Prime Minister's party, the Christian Democrats, who have governed Italy for eight years and have apparently tolerated plenty of corruption at the top, it is most embarrassing.

Mario Scelba, who in days gone by—as Minister of the Interior under de Gasperi—earned golden opinions for his courage, efficiency and integrity, is considered by both friends and enemies as a strong man. If anybody can ride the storm, he can. The dangers involved in cleaning up the administration and, if necessary, defying his own party or the extremist opposition would not stop him from taking any action he would judge legitimate. But he is a genuine democrat, who is fully aware of his parliamentary and constitutional limitations. Moreover, the coalition he has succeeded in establishing is a precarious one indeed. The moderate Social Democrats under Saragat and the Liberals are participating in the Government, while the Republicans have promised to support him in the Chamber but have refused to join the Cabinet. Whether in

the long run he can overcome his difficulties and can make a really constructive contribution towards solving his country's almost endemic social and political crisis it is too early to say. But one thing is certain: Italy will not be an easy country to govern in 1954 or in the years to come.

GEORGE SOLOVETCHIK.

## IMPRESSIONS OF ETHIOPIA

A VISIT to Ethiopia is both comforting and very interesting. That ancient and beautiful country, which has been for so many centuries more or less secluded from the rest of the world, had naturally a very different development from the other African states or colonies. It came into the limelight of international politics at the end of last century when Italy tried for the first time to play a dominant role there. With the defeat of the Italian army at Adua by Emperor Menelik, this endeavour was stopped for 39 years, but Mussolini's aggression in 1935 made Ethiopia the first victim of totalitarian aggression and domination. Owing to the Emperor's sturdy determination to maintain the independence of his country, and his successful fight to retain for Ethiopia her seat at the League of Nations, the refusal of the people to surrender to Italian rule and their continual resistance during the five years of occupation caused them to be prepared to join the British and Commonwealth armies in the field and to give great assistance in the liberation of their country, the first to be freed from totalitarian occupation. For an observer there are many signs which help us to understand the political and economic climate in a country. Long before the recent outburst in Morocco one could realise from the mood and words of the man in the street that a nationalist explosion was due any time. The same applies to police states, where you can read on the faces of the people in the street the unhappy state in which they are, just as you can see from their clothes the difficult economic situation in which they live, not to speak of the complaints they will readily give you when they can talk freely and unwatched.

The political and economic climate in Ethiopia strikes one as completely different. The people are happy, contented and healthy, kind, courteous, dignified, with a sense of humour and very religious. The writer was puzzled by this general good impression and tried hard to find if and what discontent exists, as it is bound to exist in every country. The only signs he could trace were individual grudges for purely personal reasons or because they would like a speedier advance. The people are absorbed in the struggle for economic and educational improvement. They are on the whole much more deeply absorbed in these national questions than in factions or personal disputes, and they are manifestly delighted by every new development. There are no political parties, and therefore these personal grudges are not canalised in the political field. There are sections with different interests and views, but the country is unanimously behind the father of this patriarchal democracy H.M. the Emperor Haile Selassie. Any citizen can go to him, as he holds public audiences three mornings of the week, or to the Prime Minister, the wise

Bitwoded Makonnen Endalkatchew, who does the same thing twice a week. Any complaint or demand for help and protection is followed up by the administration very quickly. One sign of the general content is the fact that the ministries are practically empty. Very few people want to see the heads or officials for personal reasons.

This happy patriarchal democracy is bound to change with the gradual introduction of modern democracy, but it is all to the credit of H.M. and the government that they do not want to rush their modernisation but do it slowly and gradually, guided by a score of experienced foreign advisers. The change is not urged and pressed by the population because they do not have to complain against a tyranny or dictatorship, and the basic human rights of each citizen are well assured. Nor does economic discontent prevail. Only the railway workers went lately on strike because the French Railway Company and its French Management did not keep its promises for pay rise. Beside this healthy political climate there are social differences, but this works out more in the due respect towards a high dignitary or a respected elderly man than in a class difference with different privileges. Grey or white hair is respected as a sign of wisdom. One explanation for this healthy state is that after the liberation the peasants were freed from the old feudal obligations to military and civil officials, etc. State taxes and Church Tithe were consolidated at a low rate and graduated to fertile, semi-fertile and poor land. Land registration and survey was at the same time instituted. Recent legislation enables tenants to convert their holdings into freeholds, and provides land for unemployed persons and State insurance for the Government employees. An Agricultural Bank grants loans for farming improvements.

Another good sign which strikes the observer is that Ethiopia is perhaps the only African country which has not to battle with those difficult and dangerous problems which plague most of Africa. It is an independent sovereign country, where there is no colour bar and no land hunger. The Ethiopians are a conglomerate of races but predominantly Amharic. A wise policy is tending to assimilate all races. The Imperial family for generations have intermarried with Galla and Tigrinya speaking families. There is no trace of xenophobia—on the contrary. There is however a slight sign of jealousy among the younger educated generation towards the wealth and monopoly of the Arab, Greek and Armenian merchants, but this jealousy is far from becoming dangerous, especially as some educational steps might be taken to encourage Ethiopian traders. Already many educated young Ethiopians have gone into business, and a sound financial backing could increase their number.

The government—especially the Minister of Finance Ato Makonne Haptewold—is keeping a close watch on all the problems which arise and might disturb the calm and happy atmosphere. He was rather perturbed that in Addis-Ababa, a town of 250,000 inhabitants there were 1 per cent. of workless. He immediately started to study the organisation of a Labour Exchange Office, and encouraged large public works. The whole capital is being reshaped, the streets and avenues are enlarged, primitive houses get new brick or stone facades, various government buildings are under construction. It is obvious that the building trade is flourishing, and there is room for serious and big foreign contractors to earn hand-

somely. Agriculture—cereals, coffee, oilseeds and cattle—is so far the main wealth of Ethiopia. The land is extremely fertile; in the warmer parts you have in a year up to 3 harvests of different crops, without any other fertilizer than grazing animals. The machinery is primitive, but according to the new theory and the French experience in parts of Morocco, as the humus is light and not mixed with clay no deep ploughing is necessary. The Ferguson tractor—which has been tried lately—with its harrow and disc implements should be sufficient. Thrashing is also primitive; by cattle and hand, here too small thrashing machines owned and operated on a co-operative basis could be the right answer. The Minister of Agriculture Blatta Ephem Medhen, who was Ambassador in London, runs his ministry in the most impressive way: there are two agricultural colleges one run in conjunction with the U.S. Point 4, the other to be organised with the help of German teachers. The Ministry has a South American as coffee expert, an Austrian expert for reafforestation, English zootechnical experts, a commission for the fight against locusts; the UNO Food and Agricultural organisation is working to stop by inoculation the frequent Rinderpest and other diseases. The immediate programme is to multiply the two existing model farms, of which I have seen that belonging to H.M. the Emperor named Shola and which is very effectively run by an Italian veterinary surgeon Dr. Martinelli. At Shola you can see prize cattle of each important breed: Guernseys, Jerseys, Ayrshires, Frisian, Hereford (all imported from the U.S.A.), Brown Swiss, etc. What is so successful is the crossing of pedigree bulls with local zebu type cows of small yield but 6-7 per cent. butterfat. This crossing and the demonstration of what an intensive farming husbandry can do is the real incentive for a steady improvement in Ethiopia's agriculture.

The army is trained by a Belgian military mission and can compete in drill and smartness with any army. It was known for centuries that the Ethiopians are excellent warriors, as has been proved lately in Korea. The Air Force is trained by Swedish Air Force officers, and they told me that the Ethiopians are as good pilots as any others. The Police was British trained and is very effective; not even a car belonging to the Emperor dares to park for a few minutes on the wrong side, such an authority has the Addis-Ababa Bobby. The cavalry has beautiful Australian horses more immune to the dangers of the region and climate. The main problem for the steady development is transport. The only railway from Addis-Ababa to the French port of Djibouti is a French private company, which exploits its monopoly with nearly prohibitive tariffs. It is underbitten now by the road transport from the Ethiopian port of Assab which is per ton, one fourth of the rail tariff. Even transport by Dakota planes of the Ethiopian Air Lines—excellently run by T.W.A.—is cheaper than by rail. There are roads linking the main regions with the capital and the ports, some of them have been built, but not too well, by the Italians, many by the Ethiopians. An American Company has undertaken the upkeep, but not to the entire satisfaction of motorists. For the future there is much to be said for cheap air freight. As for passenger transport the existing Ethiopian Airlines are already linking all main cities.

The U.S. Point 4 organisation has a big staff which is mainly concerned in studying the possibilities for mineral exploitation, industrialisation, etc. It is giving technical advice and preparing the legal framework so as to encourage foreign investment. The writer was told that 35 concerns from all West European countries are prepared to come into the country provided the law which should encourage and safeguard them is going to be accepted by the Government and passed by Parliament. This organisation also shares with the Government in financing the school of arts in Addis-Ababa and the agricultural college of Jimma. The leaders of this organisation assured me of the great wealth of the country and of the many possibilities for foreign capital. The Gold and Platinum mines are thoroughly modernised and give a great production, and the Sinclair Oil Company is ever more sure to strike soon on petrol. With the existing active budget and trade balance maintained the country is sure of a steadily growing prosperity. The Ethiopian dollar is considered a hard currency, anybody can exchange them for U.S. dollars at the official rate.

Naturally the battle between communism and Western ideas is on, for the moment only on the surface as communism has practically no adepts among Ethiopians except curiously enough among the well-to-do foreign elements. Moscow has opened large premises in which they display photographs and their magazines. It is a visual propaganda for the uneducated. I have seen six young men reading in the rooms, but the communist cinema hall for 250 people showing 3 times a week Russian films is almost always full, mainly because of the free entrance, and the Russian war films are much applauded. The U.S. Information Agency centre with an intellectual and artistic touch and its large library on the same day had 36 people reading mostly books and less the American magazines. The French have a circle with papers, magazines and artistic performances. Only the British Council has closed the former British Institute, but it does good work by providing teachers for the General Wingate Secondary School. The Ethiopian youth shows a real hunger for education, which is not compulsory—except in the capital—but very well attended. So are the English, French and German schools. Many of the best students are sent by the Government all over the world to Universities to specialise in one or the other science, and after terminating they get responsible positions in the administration.

The architect and moving spirit of this modernisation of Ethiopia is H.M. the Emperor himself, a matured statesman of great stature who in the recent past has united his country under His wise rule. He knows perfectly the qualities and defects of his people, as he knows what improvements should be adapted from different countries and also when to put them in practice. He is in constant and direct contact with his people. Hard working and benevolent, he trains the Crown Prince continuously for his important future rôle. H.M. is keen on hearing the observations and suggestions of foreign visitors, and likes to discuss with them problems of international politics or specific problems of different countries. It will always remain in history as an outstanding act of clemency and wisdom that the first measure on his return to Addis-Ababa was to decree an amnesty for all those who traded or collaborated with



the occupation forces, mainly non-Ethiopians. In his hard daily work the Emperor is helped by the Government and not less by his private secretary H. E. Ato Taffara Worg. His official visit to the U.S.A. and to other European countries will certainly strengthen the existing ties with Ethiopia, which could become also strategically of primary importance to the Western countries.

V. V. TILEA.

## JUSTICE IN AMERICA

THE species of political indecencies known to the world as McCarthyism is only the outward manifestation of a corruption in American justice that has for long given concern to those acquainted with the facts, and which in recent years, under the impetus of anti-Communism, has spread alarmingly, leading to a serious deterioration in what are known in America as "civil rights." But although the immediate causes may be the hysteria born of the fear of Communism and a lack of faith in the legal procedures established to safeguard the community, there must be and is a basic factor, or factors, which enables such monstrous growths as McCarthyism to take root and to grow pumpkin-like in such a relatively short time. Those factors are the historical lawlessness of Americans, and the circumstances of life which have compelled Americans, and still compel them, to accept the law and judicial decisions only when these either suit their purposes or can be enforced by Federal, State, or local action. There is not, in America, the sense of law-abidingness which in Britain makes not only for a comparatively very low rate of crime but also for a national feeling that justice is fair and evenly meted out, not politically distorted and erratic.

The purpose of this article is to examine the relative lack of respect for the law in America, and the use of illegalities which in the words of Mr. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court "smack of the police state." The United States of America was born in violence and illegality. Few historians nowadays find any real justification for the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary War in the so-called ill-treatment of the colonies. Instead, it is fairly generally accepted that the alleged discriminations against the colonists were used by the small minority fervently desiring independence to force their views on the largely apathetic majority—as witness both the difficulties of General Washington in his quest for troops and money, and the need for French assistance before victory was gained. The success of force in the first years of the country's history more or less set the example for future generations to follow both in national, state, local, and purely personal affairs. It was succeeded by dozens of examples in which the law was successfully flouted by persons from the President downwards. Thus there has been every practical encouragement for the theory that might is right.

The rigidity of the American Constitution has been one of the most important factors in this trend towards illegalities. The written Constitution could not and did not provide for all eventualities, and there



has always been a possibility that each President would be called upon to "stretch" the Constitution as new circumstances and conditions arose. President Jefferson, for example, confirmed the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from Napoleon even though he believed his act to be unconstitutional. The doing of illegal acts from sheer necessity has also occurred in the relationships between the Federal and State governments. The treatment of the Red Indians is also a history of broken promises and indecent behaviour. In some cases the very decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have not been enforced owing to the refusal of the President to use the police or military for such purposes. Other decisions of the Court have been ignored by the States as being too offensive to local beliefs. Thus the very authorities in whose hands the administration of justice rests have themselves been guilty of deliberately breaking or ignoring the law and legal decisions. Small wonder then that there has grown up in America a widespread feeling of congratulation for those who break the law for their own ends and "get away with it."

Lack of the ability to enforce the law has also tended to bring it into disrepute. In such a rapidly growing country as America, where distances are vast, it has never been easy to implement either the law or judicial decisions. Possession has tended to become in fact nine-tenths of the law. The lag in the settling of injustices has also encouraged the doing of illegal acts. It is indeed because of these two factors that lynching came into being—a plain indication that the country was either unable or unwilling to maintain law and order. Lynching was the outward expression of great dissatisfaction with the settling of illegalities and disputes. The very weakness of law enforcement encouraged mob justice, even if only of a rudimentary nature, and the very success of this violence further encouraged the use of violence in the settling of personal disputes. Then again, in a rich country where social distinctions are based mainly on wealth, there has been a strong tendency towards bribery and corruption. The lack of any true national type of behaviour in this respect, caused mainly by the amalgamation of so many different racial strains, has made for unconcern in these matters on the part of the general public. There has thus come into being a lack of respect for the law, not only on the part of the public generally but also in the case of the highest legal officers in the country, and right down the ranks to the local police officers, many of whom have come to be associated with such illegalities as breaking into private homes without warrant, and with brutality towards suspects. The national belief in success as a virtue has tended to lower personal codes of morality, and has encouraged the belief that both illegalities and unethical behaviour are justified in the quest for success—a lack of virtue being offset, according to this thinking, by the acquisition of an accepted virtue, success.

The remark made by Secretary of Defence Wilson on his appointment, that what was good for General Motors was good for America, clearly revealed his inability to appreciate the unethical position he would have occupied had he retained his big holding in the very company to which he would by virtue of his position have been awarding the greater part of the defence contracts. In a similar way the "fixing" of police charges by bribery and political influence has now assumed the proportions of a

national scandal, and has itself encouraged the breaking of law on other occasions by those not fortunately placed in that instance. This lack of respect for the persons supposed to be responsible for the administration of justice has led to the use of mechanical gadgets so as to avoid personal decisions. The lie detector, and the drunkometer for helping decide cases of drunkenness, are cases in point. Both are obnoxious by British standards, both seek to effect justice mechanically, yet both have quickly gained widespread acceptance in America. In some cases, laws which in effect flout the Constitution are enforced day after day. Thus the New York State Supreme Court has held that chemical tests for allegedly drunken drivers are unconstitutional. Yet a suspect driver by refusing to have a test may lose his licence. Thus such a driver is either compelled to forgo his constitutional rights or lose his licence. This monstrous abortion of decency and justice is similar to that in the Fifth Amendment cases, where people who claim their right under the Constitution not to be compelled to testify against themselves may thus lose their employment. It seems incredible that although it is perfectly legal to be a Communist in America, and, presumably, to claim one's rights under the Constitution, such a claim when allied to Communistic activity may well result in the loss of one's livelihood.

There is also more than a suspicion that perjury indictments are now being used to "get" those opponents not capable of being "got" in other ways, and that Congressional powers are being distorted to that end. Any witness, as innocent as a babe, may easily answer incorrectly questions relating to activities of long ago, especially when such questioning is carried out for several hours and days at a time. Yet many people believe, even if such beliefs as yet lack legal justification, that such answers, often to quite trivial questions, are made the basis for perjury indictments against those completely innocent of the original charges. Congressional investigations are also associated with the televising of proceedings and the badgering and in some cases the forcible ejection of witnesses whose answers have not suited the purposes of the investigators. Recently there have been the proposals to legalise the use of evidence obtained by the tapping of telephone wires, and that to deprive of citizenship those convicted of conspiring to overthrow the State. Also that by Texas to make being a communist a capital offence, punishable by death.

One of the most important cases infringing personal rights under the Constitution was that of *Irvine v. the State of California*. Irvine carried on an illegal business of gambling in California, but the police did not have sufficient testimony to bring a case against him. Under a Federal Act, Irvine bought a federal wagering tax stamp and made a report of his gambling activities. The information he gave and the stamp he bought were used to convict him and sentence him to prison for violating California's anti-gambling law. The Supreme Court held that this was not a case of compelling the witness to testify against himself in defiance of the Fifth Amendment. The more important aspect of the case, however, concerns the methods by which additional information against the suspect was obtained. The police and their agents first made a key to the home of the suspect. Then they bored a hole in the roof of his house. Using the key they entered the house, installed a microphone,

and attached it to a wire which ran through the hole in the roof to a nearby garage where officers listened in relays. Twice more they used the key to enter the house in order to adjust the microphone. First they moved it into the bedroom where the suspect and his wife slept. Next, they put the microphone into the bedroom cupboard. Then they used the key to enter the house to arrest the suspect. They had no search warrant, but they ransacked the house. The evidence so obtained was used by California to send the suspect to prison. The Supreme Court held, by a five-to-four majority, that such evidence, although illegally obtained and unconstitutional, could be used to convict the suspect. Thus, as Mr. Justice Douglas remarked in his dissenting judgment: "Today we throw the weight of the Government on the side of lawless search by affirming a conviction based on evidence obtained by it. . . . Not only is privacy invaded. The lawless invasion is officially approved as the means of sending a man to prison. . . . It is no answer that the man is doubtless guilty. The Bill of Rights was designed to protect every accused against practices of the police which history showed were oppressive of liberty."

The case is noteworthy in emphasising the lack of respect for the law even by the highest court in America. If the United States Supreme Court sanctions the use of barbarous illegalities to obtain evidence, can it really be wondered that such things as McCarthyism exist?

*New York.*

JOHN BROWN.

## THE PLIGHT OF INDONESIA

THE evacuation of Indonesia by the Dutch Government opened the door for Communism which has made rapid progress in all branches of the social, industrial and political life of the Republic. The Communists are the most highly organised of the minorities, and in spite of the wishes of the majority of the people who, generally speaking, have no desire for Communism, they have infiltrated into many of the key positions in Government and industrial centres. The National Farmers' Organisation, for example, has been taken over entirely by Communists who have elected a Communist controlled Board. In this manoeuvre they were given considerable assistance by fellow travellers at the Convention held at Jakarta in September 1953. This Organisation includes various peasants organisations composed of landowners and small farmers who are anti-Communist but for economic reasons continue as members of the Organisation. The Communists have also gained complete control of the Newspaper Writers' and Journalists' Union. In like manner they have control of the Estate Workers' Union which numbers over 100,000 members. Under Communist direction, this Union would be in a position to bring about economic distress by staging strikes on the farms which would imperil the food supply of the population especially if arranged at the time of harvest. It is evident therefore, that through the control of these powerful Organisations, the Communists are now in a position to bring overwhelming pressure to bear on the Government

in the furtherance of their own designs for the spread of Communism in the Pacific.

A large proportion of the population of Indonesia consists of Moslems. They are divided into two bitterly hostile camps, the "Darul Islam", a National body strongly opposed to Communism, and the United Moslem Party which has been actively combating Darul Islam. It is in close alliance with the Communists. A rising by Darul Islam was sternly suppressed by the Communists and Communist-Nationalist control was restored. By many outside papers Darul Islam has been regarded as a terrorist organisation of fanatical Moslems, but recent intelligence from Indonesia describes it rather as a religious movement for self-defence against the encroachments of the Communist-controlled Indonesian Government. It makes an unbending stand against all attempts to suppress the rights of Islam. There are also other Moslem Parties, The Masjumi Party, the Indonesian Moslem Association and the Hizbullah Party. The Masjumi represents political resistance by Moslems while the Moslem Association interests itself rather in the cultural sphere. The Hizbullah is the name for the Moslem Youth Organisation which attracts numbers of young people and seems to be increasing in numbers and importance. The Communists have made repeated demands on the Government for arms for their volunteer organisations. These demands have hitherto been refused by the Prime Minister but despite his refusal it is well known that in Sumatra and other distant localities, arms from Government forces have been handed over to the Communists. Arms have also been landed from Chinese boats in Java and the Celebes. In this connection it may be of interest to note that the Indonesian Ambassador in Peking is strongly inclined to the Left. Whatever their sources of supply may be, it is an undoubted fact that the Communist volunteer forces in Indonesia are well armed and are organised on military lines.

The economic situation in the Republic appears to be deteriorating to an alarming extent. Prices as well as wages are rising rapidly but, as is usually the case, wages can never catch up with the cost of living which is largely due to higher wages and consequent increase in prices of food and commodity goods. Foreign investors are inclined to fight shy of investing in industrial and commercial concerns in Indonesia owing to the uncertain state of affairs and the inclination of the Government towards the Left. The powerful influence that the Communists can exert in the Government and the country itself acts as a deterrent to any possible investment. As it is, oil companies have cancelled their programmes for development and expansion owing to their mistrust in the economic and financial stability of the Republic.

Production in Nationalised industries has decreased considerably. The Mining Unions are dominated by the Communists who have succeeded in breaking up the Islamic Trade Unions which had been formed to combat Communism. Under the Communist dominated Government however, the Communist Unions assumed complete control of the industries. The land reform measures inaugurated by the Communists is leading to chaos and disaster in the country's agriculture. Land owners are being compelled to allot a large proportion of their land to landless people with the result that much of the harvest is lost and the country is faced with a

possible food shortage which, with ordinary care, would be impossible in Indonesia.

Production is seriously handicapped by the fantastic numbers of holidays in the week on which no, or very little work may be performed. Moslems may not work after 11 a.m. on Friday, No one works after noon on Saturday. No work of any kind is performed on Sunday, a Christian holiday. There are in addition, national holidays on which no work may be done. The Indonesian considers that the tropics are too hot for serious work and prefers to linger in the shade round his rice bowl. Not so the Chinese who are a hard working community and contribute in no small degree to the present stability such as it is of their adopted country.

The general standard of living is low compared to other countries and official efforts to keep wages down to pre-war levels have brought about corruption and encouraged the black market. Corruption has become a recognised state of things in everyday life. Bribery of every minor official is essential before one can approach the sole Minister with whom all foreign traders have to do business, from the doorkeeper upwards. As this person's salary was the equivalent of £3 per month it is not difficult to understand that he had a keen desire to reap a harvest from visitors whom good fortune sent in his way.

The Dutch Mercantile Marine which carries the trade between the hundreds of islands of the Republic are to a great extent responsible for the maintenance of the economic situation. Indeed, it is not too much to say that were this service withdrawn, and the Chinese stopped work, the economy of the Republic would collapse. In spite of their business value, the Chinese are regarded as second class citizens. They have to carry special identification papers and their business concerns are much restricted. No new business may be started without Malay partners irrespective of their capacity. In short, all foreigners are cordially disliked by the Indonesians especially the Dutch. The Government policy appears to include a desire to force foreign traders to leave the country and not to allow any more to come in. If carried to its logical conclusion it is not easy to see how the export of the country could be carried on in view of the almost universal illiteracy of the inhabitants.

The natural resources of Indonesia if even only moderately developed on modern lines should render it one of the richest countries of the world. The dead hand of Communism however with its crippling conditions of nationalisation already spreads its shadow over the land and chokes the stream of individual effort by which alone prosperity can be achieved in spite of the disinclination of the Indonesians to work. Under the present régime there seems no prospect of improvement and it is probable that, swept up in the onward inexorable flood of Chinese Communism in the Pacific, Indonesia will be submerged with a few years to the level of a Russian Satellite State with a puppet government controlled and dominated by Communist officials from China and Russia. The people would stand by helpless and unable to help themselves or to save their country from slavery.

The state of the country is deplorable. Travellers are never safe from attack from brigands and terrorists. Conditions of affairs have worsened even since I was there a few years ago. We were often shot at while



travelling in our jeep from camp to town and several bombs were flung at us, happily without any harm being done. The present government is incapable of maintaining law and order. Guerilla bands of Darul Islam and the Communist Bamboo Spears are operating openly in parts of Java holding up trains and robbing the passengers. Trains running to Jakarta are now heavily guarded but in more distant districts lawlessness prevails. The army is apparently useless for any purpose whatever, being completely under the control of the leftist Government who appoints officers in accordance with their political opinions. It is incapable of suppressing the anarchy that exists in the outlying districts where brigands and guerillas are free to harry the unfortunate people without restraint. The Defence Minister and the Commander in Chief, who owe their appointments to their political activities, are powerless to effect any improvement in the military situation as it would displease the Communists who, to a large extent, control the Government. So far as is known at present, there is nothing in the nature of the Russian system of political Commissars in military units, but it is possible that at any time this system may be introduced.

Indonesia is in dangerous proximity to Australia which would be seriously threatened should the Republic become a Communist State. The general situation in the Pacific hangs to a great extent on events in Indo-China where the French and Viet Nam armies are fighting for their existence against immense masses of rebel Communist forces armed and supplied by China. Should the French be compelled to evacuate the country, the whole of South-East Asia would come under Communist domination ruled by Chinese officials. Malaya would be threatened, Siam and Burma would succumb without serious resistance. Communist rule in Indonesia would undoubtedly restore law and order with the customary purges and executions and the islands would regain much of their former prosperity, for the benefit of their Communist masters no doubt. For the first time in their life the Indonesians would be compelled to labour and holidays would be merely a memory of better times. Finally, the gloom of Communist slavery would spread over the land and freedom would cease to have a meaning.

H. E. CROCKER.

## CONFIDENT SPAIN

THE writer has visited Spain four times since the war: in 1947, 1948, 1950 and late in 1953. He related some of his impressions in an article published in the *Contemporary Review* in 1951. Visiting the country after nearly three years' interval he was again struck by the obvious progress made in many domains, but what impressed him even more was the air of confidence permeating that country. This can hardly be wondered at as 1953 was an exceptionally good year from many angles, from tourism to politics. Let us begin with the lighter subject, tourism.

Since 1947 foreign tourism has been an increasingly important factor in Spain's economic life. The cheapness of Spain contributed largely to that country becoming Europe's favourite holidaying ground. France



by her almost prohibitive prices has lost heavily to Spain, as is proved by the presence of a large contingent of French tourists in Spain who find their own country much too expensive. Swiss people succumb to Spain's attractions, not only because of her cheapness, but also because of her colourful, exotic character; and Scandinavians flock to the South and places around Alicante as well as to Majorca and Ibiza to enjoy reliable sunshine. The first place in this tourist contest is held by the British, for whom Spain offers the best market on a £40 or £50 a year allowance. While the British favour the Costa Brava—sharing it with the Germans who, since 1951, tend to assume the position of the most travelled nation of the Continent—the French proceed to Valencia and beyond, or to Majorca, in search of still cheaper regions. Costa Brava and the coast around San Sebastian are regarded as the most expensive coastal stretches of Spain. Prices, of course, are not what they used to be in 1947 or 1948, when one could get a hotel room with full board in Madrid for 50 pesetas, or live in Palma de Mallorca for as few as 35 pts. a day. The hotel prices have nearly doubled since 1948; still, there are places on the coast where one can live for about 75 pts. which is about 17 shillings a day. The prices have gone up but there is a marked improvement in some of the 'ingredients' of tourism. For example, roads are better, especially trunk roads connecting centres like Madrid and Barcelona. Many of the roads which used to be pretty calamitous only three years ago have been given decent surfaces, particularly those leading from the French frontier to Barcelona. Trains which were in a truly deplorable state show definite signs of improvement; Barcelona is now connected with Madrid by a diesel train of the TAF type built by the Fiat works and the same kind of very comfortable train, air-conditioned and excellently equipped, runs on the Barcelona-Valencia line. Granada has just been linked with Madrid by a similar autovia; Madrid has had since 1951 a modern diesel train running to Irun. These light and comfortable fast trains seem to provide the best solution to the antiquated RENFE carriages and the long distance buses show a definite improvement. Italian and German firms compete in supplying light train coaches; German cars, especially the Volkswagen and the WV 'pocket buses', rapidly become a favourite with the Spanish buyers. German businessmen make a great effort to obtain a lion's share on the Spanish market. In this they are helped by large, resourceful German colonies in Madrid and Barcelona, strengthened during the war and at the end of it by many rich people from the Reich who preferred to avoid witnessing the final reckoning in their country. More or less camouflaged German firms—like Hapag—as well as German banks survived the earth tremors of the last war and are now coming into the open to back the German trade offensive in Spain. A German Gymnasium was recently re-opened in Barcelona. Foreign tourism is now a source of considerable income to Spain. It seems that last year was by far the best of all the post-war vintages: probably about 400,000 tourists came, mainly from this country, Germany, France and Scandinavia. Tourism tends to become an all the year round proposition: one can bathe near Alicante as early as March and beaches around Malaga, like Torremolinos, boasts of sunshine until late December.

It is not only the ever-increasing influx of tourists that creates a more

optimistic mood as visitors bring foreign currency into the country. Their presence is definitely adding to the general liberalisation of life. The tedious bureaucracy which made life for a tourist in 1947 very cumbersome—one had to sign the infamous triptico even if one intended to spend a few hours in a hotel—has been almost completely abolished. The triptico is dead; the men from the Seguridad who used to walk up and down the corridors of trains have been thinned out. Spaniards admit that life has become much easier for them and there is every reason to hope that this liberalisation will continue. The regime can afford such a step as it is apparently much stronger than it was in, say, 1950. Those who advocated a more lenient policy towards Spain, her admission into various international agencies, more active and vigorous trade with her, increased contacts with her economic and cultural life, have been completely vindicated by events. Thanks to the increased influx of tourists she has liberalised her internal policy, and those who come from abroad can see for themselves that she is not the dreaded police state described by people of certain political denbminations who are always ready to salute Tito's Yugoslavia but in the same breath ostracise Franco's Spain. We know by now that the West has gained many points with Yugoslavia by increased assistance to that country, and the growing presence of tourists in Yugoslavia seems already to be acting as an additional brake on the regime's dictatorial propensities. The rules affecting Yugoslavia also affect Spain, probably even more so as Franco's Spain long ago passed the peak of severity which Tito's regime has reached only quite recently.

Spain has weathered the most difficult years both from the economic and political point of view. A very poor country, inadequately equipped in foodstuffs, was excluded from the Marshall Aid which helped richer nations to get over the dangerous post-war 'hump.' Spain found a second best, a rickety substitute, in the development of her trade and exchange with South American countries; but actually the policy of tightening the belt was adopted by a country both proud and well seasoned in poverty. Now, with American aid flowing easily, Spain should experience a definite change for the better. Of course American aid will be mainly concerned with building strategic roads across the peninsula and air bases and enlarging existing port facilities. But all these investments will inevitably bring in their wake greater prosperity: houses and encampments will be constructed, American food will flow in, employment will be found for thousands. It is by now no secret that the Spanish Government had to object to the original American scheme of direct American employment of Spanish labour: it rightly feared that this would be likely to provoke a minor revolution as the American rate of payment would greatly surpass the frugal Spanish pay. Ultimately an agreement was reached by which the recruitment of local labour was to lie with the Spanish sub-contractors. So payment will be regulated by Spanish laws, but it is obvious that better housing and better food will be the lot of those employed on the construction of American roads, bases and ports.

It is rumoured that the Americans are to build several roads cutting across the mainland from west to east—from Cadiz to Alicante, for instance—and some even say that those trunk roads will lead from the Portuguese coast to the Mediterranean coast of Spain. Airports are to

be constructed by the dozen; some of them, it is said, will be among the largest in Europe and will be able to accommodate the heaviest bombers. Spain offers excellent possibilities in that respect; there are innumerable high plateaux, ideal for building vast airfields, and clear weather and perfect visibility are provided by the climate. There are already brisk activities in various parts—especially in Alicante—connected with the promised American aid.

Even without American aid many things have been done for the workers. Any visitor to the South, round Granada and Cordoba, can see for himself new settlements, especially for those working on the new cotton plantations. New living quarters for the workers have been built in Salamanca, Avila, Granada and many other cities, as it is obvious that no modern dictatorship can neglect them. People of certain political colouring prefer to forget that, after 21, Hitler's own party was called NSDAP, and that the German workers when given various privileges through their Arbeitsfront and Kraft durch Freude were probably the least accessible to the idea of revolt against the dictator. They showed wonderful discipline throughout the war, even under severe punishment by Allied Air Forces, and very few acts of sabotage were committed; those that were accomplished were mainly by foreign workers taken to the Reich from subjugated countries. Mussolini was by no means slow in cajoling Italy's workers, and Franco's efforts are also directed towards winning for himself that section of the population which is probably the most important in any modern society marching towards industrialisation—even as inadequate and slow as Spain's still is. Social services have been steadily improved and some of the new buildings and hospitals, like the Residencia Sanitaria at Caleta near Granada, constructed for the Seguro de Enfermedad, the equivalent of the N.H.S. here, are imposing examples of those activities.

There is little doubt that Franco's position has been greatly strengthened by his deal with America and also by the apparent weakness of internal opposition. The monarchist issue seems to be less acute than even three years ago: Franco has established himself in the imagination of the masses as a Regent. People believe that after his death a monarchy will be re-established, but how is anybody's guess. The majority seem to accept the theory that for the time being there is no other choice for Spain but Franco; that Falange has greatly lost its prestige, authority and influence; that the regime is a bureaucratic-military machine with hardly any ideology left; and that the chances of the émigré politicians are practically nil. They are forgotten, for their exile has lasted too long. That Spain has emerged from her isolation after 55 years, and that the country which helped her to reappear again on the international scene was that very Power which dealt a death-blow to her position by defeating her in the Spanish-American war, is a source of great moral satisfaction for the Spaniards. They are glad that their isolation has ended, and the protracted ostracism so stupidly enforced by the Western Powers has served only to rally many elements of that proud nation to Franco's support. They set great hopes by this ending of their isolation, and America is today extremely popular in Spain. This may change with the advent of American experts, fancy goods and military establishments,

but one cannot deny that there is today an enthusiasm for things American. Britain should make an effort to come into the market, as, with the probable cooling off of Spanish enthusiasm for Americans in a not too distant future, a certain void will be created which, if not filled by this country, will inevitably be filled by the Germans.

Franco will strive to put Spain on the map again. This was clearly indicated by his message to the Cortes Españolas in which he not only declared his desire to serve the dignity, greatness and progress of his country, but also said that fortunately for Spain she has remained outside the post-war decisions which resulted in such tragic mutilation of Europe. In the same message he stressed that: *no podemos ser indiferentes a la defensa occidental*. Obviously he feels that his prudence and patience have been rewarded: he was the only prospective ally of Hitler who managed to outmanoeuvre him. Compared with Franco's astuteness, that of a true Galician, Mussolini's emotional vendetta against France and England seems a childish affair. Franco regards himself as a man who knew how to wait. The West came round to his point of view that Communism is a deadly enemy. The most powerful country in the West wants an alliance with him, and should catastrophe overtake the E.D.C. America will rely either on German re-armament and military strengthening of Spain, or will withdraw into its old conception of a 'peripheric defence' which comprises Britain, Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. In the event of defeat of the E.D.C. Franco's shares will jump even higher. This is also the feeling of people in Spain. The Spaniards feel that after 55 years of living on the circumference of world affairs they are drawn again into the ring. The pact concluded with the U.S. had a great psychological effect. Confidence returns. There is an air of expectation and optimism enhanced by the promise of American help and relief that the long isolation has at last ended.

AXEL HEYST.

## THE LEGACY OF LOUIS XIV—II

THE political ideology of Louis XIV was formulated by the most eloquent preacher of the age. In his massive treatise *La Politique tirée de l'Écriture Sainte* Bossuet spoke for France with the same authority as Locke and Halifax interpreted the England of 1688. As in his better known *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* compiled for his pupil the Dauphin, the Bishop of Meaux derives his arguments from scripture, history and reason in support of the system of dynastic autocracy. The Bible, he argues, is the touchstone of truth, in the political no less than in the religious sphere. Sharing the conviction of Hobbes that by nature men are wolves to one another, he reaches the same conclusion that absolute power, preferably exercised by hereditary monarchy, is needed to keep them in order. He rejects the Aristotelian maxim that man is a political animal, and attributes the creation of society to the instinctive physical need for self-preservation. To fulfil his duty of securing the public welfare the sovereign must possess unfettered authority; his right

once established, all other rights fade away. Private rights are valid only if recognised by the law which the ruler decrees. Having entrusted all their power to a single person, the people can do nothing against him: even their lives are in his hands and in case of disobedience he may take them. Bad princes, even tyrants, possess the same right to obedience as good ones, and the early Christians performed their duty in praying for Nero. If opposition is permitted for any purpose, the state is in peril and public order is threatened. The ruler is no less under an obligation to maintain his authority unimpaired than his subjects to obey his commands for its diminution would paralyse his capacity to keep the peace the best government is that which is furthest removed from anarchy. All benefits should derive from him alone. It is right that he should be loved but he should also be feared. Caring nothing for political or religious liberty Bossuet denies both the need and the value of constitutional guarantees for it is as easy to sign a scrap of paper as to tear it up. Hereditary monarchy has proved the best system for in working for his state the monarch is working for his own children.

So far Bossuet's premisses and conclusions are pure Hobbes, but as the argument develops vital differences emerge. While the free thinking publicist is an incurable pessimist about human nature the pious Bishop sees the stars shining in the heavens since Christian ethics point the way to a better life. Though subject to no terrestrial authority the ruler is under the moral law, and is in duty bound to maintain ancient institutions, fundamental laws and inherited privileges. Tradition, which meant as little to Hobbes as it was later to weigh with Bentham, possessed for Bossuet an authority which he dared not and had no wish to ignore. He believed in the wisdom of our ancestors, and in his eyes the passage of time gradually legitimised conquest. If, however, the ruler neglects his duties—even if he openly flouts the laws of God and orders his subjects to do the same—he could neither be punished nor resisted: Like the early Christians they must if necessary suffer and die. While the system of Hobbes rested on the fear of punishment, the political edifice of Bossuet was theoretically cemented by love. He was too fine a spirit to flatter, and his paean to the ruler breathes genuine devotion. "A good subject loves his prince as the embodiment of the public weal and the safety of the state, as the air he breathes, as the light of his eyes, as his life and more than his life. He is more than the head of the state and the fatherland incarnate. Next to the love of God comes love for the prince, and how greatly must he love his people in order to retain their love! All men are brothers and should love each other like brothers. If he fears the people, all is lost. If he fears the great nobles, the state is weak. He must fear God alone. The more exalted the office, the greater the severity of the divine judge: mercy is for the little man, torments for the mighty. Without the divine judgment-seat absolute authority degenerates into arbitrary despotism." Both as a believer in an all-powerful executive and as a pillar of the Catholic Church Bossuet rejects liberty of conscience as a challenge to the true faith and a threat to the spiritual solidarity of the state. As an embodiment of the *mystique* of absolute monarchy on a Christian basis in seventeenth century France Bossuet's treatise ranks with the writings of James I and the Divine Right teachings of High



Church theologians of the reign of Charles I. Its purpose was to convince the heir to the throne that a Christian prince was the representative of God on earth with all the powers, privileges and obligations appertaining to the post. Written when *Le Roi Soleil* was at the height of his glory, it breathed boundless confidence in the strength and stability of the Bourbon monarchy. As, however, the reign moved towards its close an atmospheric change, arising from the almost unceasing wars and the ever increasing frustration and resentment, stimulated a search for alternatives.

The critical spirit of a younger generation found its most eloquent expression in Fénelon who, like Bossuet, was appointed to train an heir to the throne, though he was allotted a more promising pupil. No preceptor could have struck sparks from the Dauphin, but the qualities of his son, the Duc de Bourgogne, seemed to authorise the highest hopes. Saint-Simon's portrait of Fénelon is one of the gems in his incomparable gallery. "This prelate was tall and thin, well proportioned, with a big nose, eyes from which fire and intelligence poured like a torrent, and a face unlike any I ever saw and which, once seen, could never be forgotten. It was full of contradictions, yet they always harmonised. There was gallantry and gravity, earnestness and gaiety; there was in equal proportions the teacher, the Bishop and the Grand seigneur. His whole personality breathed thought, intelligence, grace, measure, above all nobility. It was difficult to turn one's eyes away." For Saint-Simon the Archbishop of Cambrai was the most dazzling ornament of the Court. No French ecclesiastic except Richelieu has left such a legend of personal distinction; no Frenchman of his time looked so far ahead and gave his contemporaries such sound advice. A century before the Revolution he proclaimed that the pyramid must rest, not on its apex, but on its base, and two centuries before the League of Nations he pleaded for an interdependent world. It was characteristic of this practical idealist that his earliest publication was a plea for the higher education of women.

*Télémaque*, like *Gulliver's Travels*, is a *roman à thèse*, a political tract in fictional form: everyone realised that it was a broadside against autocracy in general and Versailles in particular. Translated into many languages, it was read with delight by the King's enemies, including the persecuted Huguenots at home and abroad. Mentor is the oracle, *Télémaque*, the son of Ulysses, the pupil eager to learn. Every incident contains a moral or implies a criticism. Bossuet was the greatest of French Conservatives except Joseph de Maistre, Fénelon the greatest Liberal of his age. His sharpest arrows are aimed at the craving for fame and the wars of conquest to which it led. Though he scarcely ranks with his contemporaries William Penn and the Abbé Saint-Pierre among the pioneers of a League of Nations, he denounced the slogans of arrogant nationalism with equal force. Not merely wars but the trade barriers of Colbert's mercantilist system were an offence against the conception of the unity of mankind. War was the costliest of royal follies, but the building mania was not far behind. Believing that all people and all nations are brothers, he paints a picture of the Elysian fields, a Christian utopia, a land of peace and joy. "Peu sérieux," commented Bossuet, "et peu digne d'un prêtre." Though the Eagle of Meaux had powerful wings he lacked originality and never soared into the upper regions of the sky.



The attack on the principle and practice of autocracy was developed in an unpublished *Lettre à Louis XIV* so vehement in tone that its authenticity might be challenged but for the autograph manuscript, doubtless a first draft. "All you Ministers," begins Fénelon, "have abandoned all the old maxims in order to glorify your authority. People no longer speak of the state, only of the King and his good pleasure. They have raised you to the skies, but absolute power is only a sham, for real power resides with the Ministers, who have been harsh, arrogant, unjust, violent, false." The King's worst fault was his passion for war, and the Dutch War had unleashed all the troubles of France. "Your Majesty was driven into it to enhance your glory but such a motive can never justify a war." A terrible and obviously exaggerated picture is drawn of the plight of France in 1691. "Your peoples are dying of hunger. Agriculture is almost at a standstill, all the industries languish, all commerce is destroyed. France is a vast hospital. The magistrates are degraded and worn out. It is you who have caused all these troubles. The whole kingdom having been ruined, everything is concentrated in your hands and everyone must feed out of your hand. The people which loved you so much is beginning to withdraw its affection, its confidence and even its respect. Your victories no longer arouse delight. There is only bitterness and despair. Sedition is boiling up. You do not love God; you only fear Him with a slavish fear. It is hell you are afraid of. Your religion consists of superstition and superficial practices. You relate everything to yourself as if you were God on earth." That the letter in the form we know it was read by the King is inconceivable.

The death of the Dauphin in 1711 turned all eyes to the Duc de Bourgogne who might be expected to succeed his septuagenarian grandfather at any moment; and there, it seemed, was the chance of the saintly reformer at Cambrai. "Our trouble," he wrote to the Duc de Chevreuse, "is that this war has been the personal enterprise of the King, who is ruined and discredited. It should be made the concern of the whole nation, which must save itself." Since he might perhaps be called to power, he felt bound to draft a new policy for the new reign. After prolonged discussions with his old pupil's closest friends, the Duc de Beauvilliers, his ex-Governor, and the Duc de Chevreuse, he formulated maxims in which he approached closer to practical issues than ever before. The first tasks were to overcome the active or passive resistance of the Court, abolish sinecures, curb the building craze, and introduce simpler furniture and cheaper apparel. Such austerity could only become effective if the people joined in the reforming campaign. For this purpose it would be necessary not only to summon the States General which had not met for a century, but to integrate it into the life of the nation, meeting every three years and sitting as long as circumstances required. Since the members would doubtless be as moderate and loyal as the Estates of Languedoc and Brittany, they could discuss every aspect of policy at home and abroad. In his anxiety to limit the power of the ruler he argued that Gallicanism was no longer necessary since the power of Rome had so sharply declined. Give the Church a little more freedom and let the parishes have *cures* of their own choice. The most conspicuous omission in this generous programme of reform is the absence of any reference to

liberty of conscience, for Fénelon approved the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and had no use for the Jansenists.

A few other points are made in a little essay, *Examen de conscience des devoirs de la royauté*, which urges the sovereign to inform himself in detail of the state of the various classes and the working of central and local institutions. Above all he must have no favourites and must strive to avoid war, the mother of misery; if forced to fight, he should observe the laws of war. "He is the cleverest and the most fantastical head in the kingdom," grumbled the old King. Had he peered more closely into that scintillating brain he would have recoiled in anger at the audacity of its schemes. That the Duc de Bourgogne never came to the throne was the disappointment of Fénelon's life and was a major misfortune for France, for the first seeds of revolution were sown in the closing years of Louis XIV.

A scarcely less formidable critic of the régime, though he attacked on a narrower front, emerged from a different camp. Among the Marshals whose triumphs built up the renown of Louis XIV none occupied a loftier place in the regard of his countrymen and the Court than Vauban. Though Condé and Turenne were his superiors on the battlefield, he was the prince of military engineers whose fortresses on the eastern frontiers remained the admiration of Europe long after his death. He was also a man of noble and unselfish character whose interests embraced the problems of peace no less than war. Staggered by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, he deplored in a letter to Louvois the blow struck at industry and commerce and the revival of religious strife. Despite a rebuff he forwarded a copy to Mme de Maintenon, but the appeal fell on deaf ears. The decision, he argued, weakened France by the loss of industrious citizens and strengthened her enemies. Kings were masters of the life and property of their subjects but not of their opinions, and they should not press that authority too far. His next venture was more ambitious and might appear to have more chance of success, for the financial plight of war-worn France was notorious. The Peace of Ryswick in 1697 was merely a truce after a generation of continuous struggle which emptied the treasury and almost beggared the people. The Intendants were instructed to investigate and report on the condition and needs of their districts. It was the wrong method of approach, for they were likely to minimise the evils and in some cases to conceal the abuses which brought them gain. Far weightier was the counsel of Vauban who had studied conditions on the many journeys and marches of his long life. No one since Sully had displayed such deep and unflagging interest in the peasantry, which he regarded as the backbone of the state.

When the return of peace afforded him ampler leisure Vauban summarised his conclusions in *La Dime Royale*. Since France, he estimated, could support 24 millions but contained only 19, there was no over-population; the climate was temperate, the soil good, the peasantry thrifty and industrious. Why then was there such misery? Taxation was heavy but not unbearable if the burden were fairly distributed. The fundamental cause was that many contributed too much while the nobility and the clergy were exempt. The privilege of the former was an in-

heritance from feudal times, when the landed proprietors were expected to aid the Crown from their own resources in time of need. The exemption of the clergy was equally a survival from the ages when the Church was a law to itself. These financial entrenchments Richelieu himself had not attempted to storm. The gross injustice was resented by the Tiers État, but there were no institutions through which it could express discontent. Every year the King's Council fixed the sum required from the several districts, and the local collectors required police protection. If the taxpayer could not meet the demand his animals, agricultural implements and even his furniture might be seized. The knowledge that a substantial portion of the yield never reached the coffers of the state increased the smart.

Minor changes, argued Vauban, were useless and a new deal was required. A tax should be levied on all citizens, ranging from 5 to 10 per cent. according to the needs of the state, in place of the existing *taille*, local *douane* and *aides*. The idea of a tenth was familiar to the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans and the early French kings. The Church tithe aroused little complaint and involved no corruption. The hated *taille* was not adjusted to the capacity to pay, since the value of properties changed and gross favouritism was rife. To avoid the *taille* peasants often concealed their resources and went about in rags. Comparing the yield of tithe and *taille* in some fifty parishes, he discovered that the former yielded the larger sum. The Dime Royale would be assessed on land, houses, mills, fisheries, salaries, pensions, and every other source of income, concealment of assets being punishable by confiscation and doubling the original demand. Manual workers should only pay a thirtieth, since they were frequently unemployed and their standard of life was low. Passing to changes in indirect taxation, the author proposed the reduction of the salt tax which many were too poor to pay, and an extra charge on wine supplied in cabarets, a measure which might help to keep peasants at home and not waste their money on drink. The new system should be introduced gradually so that the whole country could witness its benefits. It was not intended to increase the total yield of taxation but to diminish the burden on those least able to bear it. Vauban expected opposition from the "leeches and harpies." He accepted autocracy but declared war on the swarm of parasites up to the highest levels.

Vauban wrote, not to inflame the public, for his book was not on sale, but to convert the King and his council, expecting that his record of service would ensure attention if not gratitude. A manuscript copy was sent to the King who, if made aware of its contents, cannot have resented it, for the author was promoted a Marshal two years later. When, however, it was printed anonymously in 1707 without seeking the usual permission of the police, which he feared would be refused, a storm blew up. Though the book was only presented to a few influential friends, the authorship was no secret, and it was denounced by the tax farmers and other vested interests. A demand was raised that the audacious reformer should be sent to the Bastille and his book destroyed. The shock was too much for the old warrior, who died of a broken heart. When the King heard the news he exclaimed: "I lose a man greatly attached to my

person and the state." Perhaps he may have felt a momentary twinge that he had not held his shield over a man who was saluted by Saint-Simon as the best of Frenchmen. Three years later he was posthumously vindicated when the King imposed a special war levy of a tenth for three successive years. Yet temporary expedients were no substitute for the drastic reforms which alone could avert a revolution when the cup of suffering and exasperation was full.

G. P. GOOCH.

*To be continued.*

## THE FATHER OF RUSSIAN MARXISM

"It is *impossible* to become an intelligent *real* Communist without studying—precisely *studying*—all that Plekhanov wrote on philosophy, because that is the best there is in the whole international literature of Marxism." Lenin, in a pamphlet published in January, 1921.

**G**EORGE VALENTINOVIC PLEKHANOV, the Father of Russian Marxism, was eclipsed by more spectacular rivals and is little known outside Russia. Yet he founded the first Russian Marxist party in 1883—the year of Marx's death—collaborated with Lenin on the editorial board of *Iskra* ("The Spark") and lived to witness and oppose the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917. Plekhanov was born in 1856, the son of a small estate-owner, and attended the military secondary school at Voronezh. While still in his 'teens he adopted advanced views, and it is said that when his father died in 1873, he threatened to set fire to the crops on the family estate if his mother did not agree to sell the land to the tenants. In 1874, after a year at a military college, he went to the mining institute at St. Petersburg. The *narodnik* (populist) movement was at that time catching the imagination of Russian students, and young Plekhanov was soon immersed in political activity. In 1876, a few days after his twentieth birthday, he took part in a public demonstration organised by the "Land & Freedom" movement. As a consequence of this, he was in danger of arrest and fled abroad. He returned to Russia the following year and engaged in underground political activity.

The *narodnik* movement at this time consisted of two main groups. The extremists believed that only by terrorism and assassination could their revolutionary objectives be achieved; the moderates favoured a policy of education and propaganda. In 1879 the movement formally split, Plekhanov becoming the leader of a moderate secessionist group known as "Black Partition". A few months later Plekhanov again went into exile. Having encountered the works of Marx and Engels, Plekhanov now declared himself a Marxist. He translated the Communist Manifesto into Russian, and Marx and Engels wrote a special Foreword for the edition. In 1883 Plekhanov, together with Paul Axelrod, Vera Zasulich, and Leo Deutsch, founded in Geneva the "Emancipation of Labour Group", the first and for a time the only Russian Marxist party. He

soon became as well known in advanced Russian circles as Herzen had been half a century before. Lenin was greatly influenced by his early writings which he apparently first encountered when he was a student in Kazan. Trotsky recounts that at one time Lenin was content merely to echo Plekhanov's views on philosophical questions. Certainly Lenin always admired Plekhanov as a pioneering Marxist thinker, and Lenin's widow records that the works of Plekhanov stood beside those of Marx and Engels in Lenin's study in the Kremlin. "The best exposition of the philosophy of Marxism and of historical materialism is given by G. V. Plekhanov", wrote Lenin. "His personal services in the past were enormous. During the twenty years 1883-1903 he produced a large number of excellent works." Trotsky described Plekhanov as "the profound and brilliant commentator of Marx, the teacher of entire generations, the theorist, politician, publicist and orator of European fame."

In a letter written from prison in 1896, Lenin asked that a copy of Plekhanov's *On the Question of the Development of the Monist View of History* should be sent to him. He later described it as "a remarkably logical and valuable exposition." Alexander Potresov, the socialist publisher, recounts how in 1894 he persuaded Plekhanov to write a defence of Marxism which could be published legally in Russia. He went from St. Petersburg to Geneva, where he met Plekhanov's wife who told him that her husband was in London. Potresov went to London and had no difficulty in persuading Plekhanov to write the book. "We settled down in the same lodgings. He wrote . . . and I copied . . . In the first half of October I returned to St. Petersburg . . . The book was ready by December 20 . . . was put on sale on December 29, and was sold out in less than three weeks." It appeared under the pseudonym of N. Beltov and with the innocuous title already quoted. "I selected a long and clumsy title as a lightning-conductor," wrote Plekhanov later.

In 1900 Lenin was released and, accompanied by Alexander Potresov and Julius Martov, went to Geneva to discuss the starting of a Marxist paper and what he called a "theoretical journal". Eventually it was decided to establish a weekly magazine *Iskra* ("The Spark") and a journal *Zarya* ("Dawn"). There was to be an editorial board of six—Plekhanov, Paul Axelrod, and Vera Zasulich from the "Emancipation of Labour" group, and Lenin, Martov, and Potresov from the newer "St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Classes". It was a difficult venture from the start. Apart from the difference of temperament and age between the two trios on the editorial board, there was the geographical problem. These Russian publications were issued first from Stuttgart, then from Munich, and finally from Geneva. Some members of the board lived in Switzerland, others in London. Lenin abounded in confidence and resented criticism. Plekhanov, the "Elder Statesman" of the board and nearly twenty years Lenin's senior, was inclined to be pompous. Vera Zasulich once told Lenin that Plekhanov was like a greyhound. "He will shake a thing for a while, and then drop it; whereas you are a bulldog—yours is the death grip." "I know George [Plekhanov] can be unbearable," she said on another occasion, "but in reality he is an awfully dear beast." N. A. Alexeyev, a Russian refugee in London, once told Trotsky that Lenin might prove more important for



the Russian revolution than Plekhanov, a remark which evidently surprised Trotsky at the time.

Plekhanov was one of the forty-three delegates who attended what has come to be known as the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, held first in Brussels and then in London in 1903. It is, perhaps, misleading to call the 1903 gathering the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. for the R.S.D.L.P. did not exist in 1903. In 1898, nine representatives of a number of Russian Socialist groups had met in Minsk in an unsuccessful effort to create a unified socialist party. The majority of those who attended represented the so-called Economists, those who believed that the working-class should engage in an economic struggle against their employers, leaving the political struggle to the *bourgeoisie*. These views were akin to those of the German "revisionist" Edward Bernstein and of some of the early English Fabians.

Lenin was determined that the 1903 congress should face up to the basic issue facing the Russian Socialist movement. An industrial proletariat, which—according to Marxist orthodoxy—should act as a revolutionary spearhead, barely existed in Russia. Some of the Russian Marxists, including young Stalin at that time, took the view that it was pointless to work for immediate revolution and that the proper course was to wait until industrial capitalism had further developed. Lenin, on the contrary, had little time for theoretical arguments of this kind. He believed that the key to success was to organise a resolute and disciplined party, ready to seize power when the right moment arrived. On the surface, it was on this question of organization rather than on the niceties of Marxist theory that the 1903 conference split. Lenin proposed to the conference the following definition of the duties of party membership: "A member of the party is one who accepts its programme, and supports it both materially and by personal participation in one of its organisations". Martov proposed to replace "personal participation in" with the looser phrase "regular co-operation under the leadership of". Plekhanov gave Lenin somewhat half-hearted support; Axelrod, Zasulich, and Potresov supported Martov's amendment. After a long debate, a vote was taken, and Martov's wording was adopted by 28 votes to 22. This was a severe defeat for Lenin, and it was an added disappointment that only Plekhanov from the *Iskra* editorial board voted with him. Plekhanov, it seems, had come to the conclusion that Lenin was a man to be reckoned with, and he was anxious to avoid a breach. "Napoleon had a passion for getting his marshals divorced from their wives," he said; "some marshals gave way, although they loved their wives. Comrade Akimov in this respect is like Napoleon—he wants to divorce me from Lenin at all costs. But I am showing a stronger disposition than the Napoleonic marshals; I am not out to divorce Lenin, and I hope he does not intend to divorce me."

Then Lenin's luck changed. The question had arisen of the relationship of the Jewish Socialist Bund to the R.S.D.L.P. The delegates of the Bund wished to have their organisation recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish working-class. Having been defeated on this issue, their five delegates withdrew from the conference. This altered the balance of forces, and at the next session two delegates from the Union of Russian Social Democrats Abroad (Akimov and Martynov) also with-

drew. Lenin could now command a majority of votes, and his supporters thereupon became known as Bolsheviks (the majority).

Plekhanov was appointed president of the R.S.D.L.P., an executive committee was formed exclusively from Lenin's Bolshevik supporters, and an editorial board for *Iskra* was elected, consisting of Plekhanov, Lenin, and Martov, though in fact Martov refused to serve. The 1903 conference seemed to have ended in a Leninist victory. But to Plekhanov there was another side to the picture. He had spent twenty-five years in the confused and bitter atmosphere of revolutionary intrigue; of secession, division, and withdrawal; of rivalry and competition. The 1903 conference had been held in an attempt to achieve what had been attempted at Minsk five years before, the creation of a united Russian Socialist party. The result had been the withdrawal of the Jewish Bund and the Union of Russian Social Democrats Abroad, and the division of the remainder into two factions—Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Plekhanov regarded it as a major task to unite the two sections; Trotsky, who was temperamentally a Bolshevik but had voted with Martov on the organisational issue, took the same view. There was the further point that Plekhanov's old associates Axelrod and Zasulich were in the Menshevik camp. Plekhanov, in a spirit of conciliation, decided to co-opt on to the editorial board of *Iskra* a number of Mensheviks. He told Lenin he wanted to "kill the Mensheviks with kindness". But Lenin was uncompromising; he had no wish to appease his opponents who, in any case, now only commanded a minority of votes in the party. He soon resigned from the board of *Iskra*, which thereupon became a Menshevik journal. This was really the final rupture between Plekhanov and the Bolsheviks. Thereafter Plekhanov nearly always found himself in disagreement with Lenin. They differed on their attitude to the 1905 Russian Revolution, to the world war, to the Provisional Government, and finally to the Bolshevik seizure of power. It is true that in 1906, the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions came together again as a result of a so-called "unity" conference held in Stockholm. But it was an unreal rapprochement and did not last. Each faction suspected that the other was being disloyal. There were, in fact, two rival organisations existing side by side, and in 1912 they again parted company. Thereafter there were two distinct Russian Marxist parties until the suppression of the Mensheviks after the Revolution.

Plekhanov returned to Russia after the overthrow of the Tsar, arriving in Petrograd three days before Lenin. Although he was now definitely identified with the Menshevik point of view, he still thought that the two Marxist factions must unite if they were to be successful. But he held, as he had in 1879, that the prime need was for education and propaganda rather than revolutionary violence. Along with Leo Deutsch, Vera Zasulich, and Gregor Alexinsky, he started a "League of Personal Example". These people recaptured some of the fervour of the early *narodniks*, while rejecting the grosser forms of nihilism. They were devoted visionaries, almost puritanical in their personal lives. But Bolshevik-Menshevik unity was impossible because, apart from anything else, the two factions differed on the basic question of their attitude to the war with Germany. When Kerensky announced in June that a Russian offensive had begun, Plekhanov took up the position of what Lenin called "social chauvinism":

"Citizens if I ask you what this day is you will say 'Monday'. But that is a mistake. Today is the Resurrection Day. Resurrection of our country and of the whole world. Russia, having thrown off the yoke of Tsarism, has decided to throw off the yokes of the enemy." By contrast Lenin was at this time denouncing Kerensky and "the ten capitalist ministers" whose collapse—he asserted—was both inevitable and imminent.

In August Plekhanov was invited to join the Provisional Government, but the Petrograd Soviet was opposed and he declined the appointment. When the October Revolution took place he was lying ill and unhappy at Tsarkoye Selo. He was invited by Boris Savinkov, Kerensky's deputy, to become Prime Minister in a future non-Bolshevik government. "I have given forty years to the proletariat," he replied, "and I will not shoot it down even when it is going along the wrong road; and I don't advise you to either." A few days later Red troops captured the town. Some guards entered his house to search for arms and found him in bed. "To what class of society do you belong?" they asked him. Plekhanov answered proudly: "I am a revolutionary who for forty years has devoted his life to the struggle for liberty." Unimpressed a workman replied: "Anyway you have now sold yourself to the *bourgeoisie*." His paper was suspended by the Bolsheviks a few weeks later. Shortly afterwards he left Russia and settled in Finland where he died in 1918, an unhappy and largely forgotten figure.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY.

## ROBERT BRIDGES

CAN anyone hope to say anything not new, but even fresh? Can we say anything more about Robert Seymour Bridges? It may well be doubted; and yet one is always the better for a walk in the morning air—a tonic which may be taken over and over again without any sense of sameness, or any failure of its invigorating quality. There is a pervading wholesomeness in the poetry of this man—a vernal property that soothes and refreshes in a way of which no other has ever found the secret. His writings were prolific and sustained. His first volume appeared in 1873 and last in 1929; in that year he received the Order of Merit as a small token of appreciation of his verses. After an enviably extensive training as a classical scholar, a traveller and a physician, he retired from professional life at the age of thirty-seven, and devoted his remaining days to the interest of culture—pure English, art, hymn-singing, and above all, the creation of poetry. During his long, laborious life, he produced almost every type of poem, from dramas to quantitative hexameters, but the most notable is his immense body of odes and lyrics. No contemporary humanist was more convinced than Bridges that to reform the poet, you must reform his prosody, and with this in view he experimented in the choice of words and the techniques of versification.

In content, in thought, in imaginative power, Bridges' work can claim a distinctive place in our literature. He is peculiarly an English poet; and English in a more homely sense than ever was Tennyson. The subject of his verse he turns to those joys of everyday life that lie nearest to hand—dreams, memories, friendships, and in particular the joy of the countryside, the beauty of the flowering bank, the June meadow, the winter thicket, the weald stretching away from the foot of the hill. These he is content merely to describe; hardly any nature poetry is more simply descriptive than that of Bridges; and in everything he finds a kindly joy which suffices to fill the content of his days and the measure of his verse. His poems are idylls and songs of graceful love, vignettes of landscape and meadowed valleys, glimpses into a serene and undisturbed mind. Of himself he has written—

"But since I have found the beauty of joy  
I have done with proud dismay;  
For howso'er man hug his care  
The best of his art is gay."

If a pensive melancholy visits him, the "proud dismay" of greater poets can hardly have touched him at any time. All his work is the reflex of a serene, a shy, and cultured mind far removed from the stress of the world's endeavours and battles. His lyrics are the work of the scholar, the recluse and the prosodist, gifted with a true, and constant, strong emotional response to life.

In 1913 Robert Bridges was appointed to the office of Poet Laureate which he held till his death in 1930. Among living poets none has a name more to be held in honour for the rare and delicate beauty of his work, for the respect he has shown for his art, and for the light he has thrown upon the laws and secrets of English versification. Many of his lyrics are of rare beauty—"Awake, my heart, to be loved", "There is a hill beside the silver Thames", the ode "A Coy Inquisitive Spirit, the Spirit of Wonder", to name a few—and much that he has written is scarcely inferior. Besides being skilled in verbal music he is a master of the descriptive phrase. The quality of his lines on a view of warships:

"Those murderous queens walking in Sabbath sleep,  
Glided in line upon the windless deep."

pervades much of his work; and in his highly finished narrative poem "Eros and Psyche", the level of description is admirably sustained. Robert Bridges is truly the poet of Beauty and joy. His work owes much to a very fine culture, of which the most splendid fruit was his philosophical poem, *The Testament of Beauty*, (1929). Although the poet uses the purest language, the feelings to which he appeals are often rather subtle. But all whose taste is already formed must value Bridges' poetry for its unflinching refinement, and honour its author for his devotion to the highest ideals of his art. It has been often remarked that "the distinguishing qualities of Robert Bridges' verse are sober sincerity and a fastidious simplicity." In his love of experimentalising, in his dainty and delicate sense of rhythm, in the freshness of his diction, he derives from romanticism. Yet how unlike are the pearl greys of his decorative muse to the

glowing tints of romantic verse as we know it. Take for instance a portion of this song:

"I have loved flowers that fade,  
 Within whose magic tents  
 Rich hues have marriage made,  
 With sweet unmemoried scents.

"A honeymoon delight—  
 A joy of love at sight,  
 That ages in an hour—  
 My song be like a flower!"

Robert Bridges is certainly a passionate writer, yet the passion has light without heat. His finest work has the beauty of a spring dawn—a dawn of gradually diffused silver grey, never merging into anything warmer than a faint delicate amber. He belongs neither to the philosophic versemaker, as illustrated by Matthew Arnold, nor the marmoreal school of sculptured phrase, of which Landor is so distinguished an exponent. He is reflective and pensive like Arnold; he is austere cool like Landor; but his muse, unlike these, is essentially a lyric muse. Perhaps Robert Bridges has made his point of view sufficiently clear in this verse:

"Simple enjoyment calm in its excess,  
 With not a grief to cloud, and not a ray  
 Of passion overhot my peace to oppress;  
 With no ambition to reproach delay,  
 Nor rapture to disturb my happiness."

Wherever the English language is spoken Bridges' poems have been the subject of criticisms, favourable and adverse. In regard to the lines quoted above it has been remarked that "this is more ascetic even than Wordsworth, whose austere raptures were none the less raptures; whereas the 'simple enjoyment' of Mr. Bridges seems a curiously negative affair." To some this rigid tranquillity may suggest stagnation. Yet there is certainly never that; and though it may be candidly conceded such a temperament is singularly restricted in its appeal, yet to a few it can make a very definite appeal. The work of Robert Bridges is essentially the work of a sensitive scholar, who dallies delicately with the simplicities and complexities of Nature and of Art; shrinking from robust expression and fervent rapture as something noisy and distasteful. We can imagine him retreating with faint, well-bred amazement from the coverts where the nightingale was singing out her heart; not wholly unresponsive, for after all he is also a singer, but inclined to endorse the criticism of the lady who observed after one of these tumults of song, "Very pretty; but don't you think the bird overdoes it?"

Robert Bridges has a horror of overdoing anything. But we must be thankful for the gifts he has bestowed upon the language; and the delicate flutings of our ex-Poet Laureate carry with them admittedly a magic of their own, while the deft skill of his prosodic experiments interest even when they do not convince. There is a twilight of Rossetti that hints at



nocturnal mysteries, but a cool silver grey from which he whispers to us sedately and graciously.

In his book *Ideas in the Twentieth Century*, H. V. Routh has summarised Bridges' writing in a scholarly manner. "The reader will at once appreciate the impeccably good taste, the sensitive and scholarly handling of words, the chastened pleasure in Nature's everyday beauty, and sometimes what Hopkins called "the manly tenderness and flowing, never-failing music"; the quality which Charles Williams has termed "beauty in restraint". Edward Thompson, in *Robert Bridges* (1944) has depicted the old-world, scholarly atmosphere in which the poet lived, and makes much of this middle period of lyrics devoted to the "growth of love" and the study of Nature's charm. Yet this sometimes rather superficial faultlessness was not the goal of his career. It was a preliminary. Even his most felicitous lyrics—for instance, "London Snow" and "Asian Birds"—despite their "assured quietness" and "more certain knowledge" are exercises, mere glimpses of a much wider synthesis. Bridges had grasped the varied and apparently conflicting essentials of scientific and artistic culture, and then, as he wrote to Henry Bradley in 1901, "beyond that, stretching out to infinity, the realm of the imagination." Since the vision, after ranging over humanism and science, found its spiritual focus in the necessity for what is fair and lovely, he entitled his exposition *The Testament of Beauty* (1929).

The long, beautiful poem, the climax of his life, is one of the most revealing and characteristic documents of the twentieth century. "Many poets have felt," writes Routh, "consciously or subconsciously, that a sense of beauty is the crown of culture, even the blessedness of religion." Bridges differs from all of them in that he is an inveterate teacher and tries to convince as well as persuade.

*The Testament of Beauty* is chiefly important because the poet writes with the exaltation of a mystic, and is yet in sympathy with D'Arcy Thompson and A. N. Whitehead, who maintain that the structure of matter corresponds to the morphology of art, and with Santayana, the materialist who accepts super-material values, a believer in "the realm of essences". It is also noteworthy that to a certain extent Bridges anticipates Herbert Read's definition of art as "mankind's effort to achieve integration with the basic forms of the physical universe and the organic rhythms of life". Some critics have said that Bridges would have been a great prose writer, and perhaps the discipline of prose might have saved him from many distracting digressions and discontinuities; but he wrote in "loose alexandrines", in which he expected his argument to move freely.

Perhaps the most beautiful part of his life was his old age. That in most men is decay, was in him but beneficent prolongation and adjournment. His interest in affairs unabated, his judgment undimmed, his fire unchilled, his last years were indeed "lovely as a Lapland night". There never was a sign of dilapidation in that stately edifice. His equanimity was beautiful. He loved life, as men of large vitality always do, but he did not fear to lose life by changing the scene of it. Visiting him in 1929, just before *The Testament of Beauty* was published, with a friend, he said to us, among other things—"I have no desire to die, but also no reluctance. Indeed, I have a considerable curiosity about the

other world." There was a springtime mood somewhere in his nature "that put a spirit of youth in everything". He seemed to feel that he could draw against an unlimited credit of years. He told me smilingly when my friend and I were about to leave him, and mentioned a trip to Trinidad later in the year, "Well, well. I mean to go myself when I am old enough to profit by it." He was at the time eighty-five. We have seen many old men whose lives were made waste and desolation, who made longevity disreputable by their untimely persistence in it; but in his length of years there was nothing that was not venerable. To him it was fulfilment not deprivation; the days were marked to the last for what they brought, not for what they took away. The memory of what Robert Bridges did will be lost in the crowd of newer activities, but it is the memory of what he was that remains precious to us. His courage and highmindedness were personal to him; let us believe that his industry, his love of literature, his devotion to duty, go in some sort to the credit of the society which gave him birth and formed his character. In one respect he is especially interesting to us, as belonging to a class of men of whom he was representative, and whose like we have not now a great deal. Born and bred in an age of greater social distinction than ours, he was a gentleman in a sense that is good even in a welfare state. He had the sense of a certain personal dignity inherent in him, and which could not be alienated by any whim of the popular will. There is no stouter stickler than this for independence of spirit, no surer guarantee of that courtesy which, in its consideration of others, is but paying a debt of self-respect.

It is true to say that the contemporary world is apt to be the gull of brilliant parts; and the writer of a lucky poem or painter of a picture, the winner of a lucky battle, gets perhaps more than is due to the solid result of his triumph. It is time that fit honour should be paid also to Bridges who showed a genius for public usefulness, for the achievement of character, who shaped his life to a certain classic proportion, and came off conqueror on those inward fields where something more than mere talent is demanded for victory. The memory of such a man should be cherished as the most precious inheritance which one generation can bequeath to the next. However it might be with public favour, public respect followed Robert Bridges unwaveringly during his long life, and this was because he had never forfeited his own. In this, it appears to us, lies the lesson of his life, and his claim upon our grateful recollection, and it is this which makes him an example; and if the measure of deeds be the spirit in which they are done, that fidelity to instant duty which according to Herbert makes an action fine, then Robert Bridges' length of years should be very precious to us for its lesson. Talleyrand, whose life may be compared with his for the strange vicissitudes which it witnessed, carried with him out of the world the respect of no man, least of all his own; and how many of our own public men have we seen whose old age but accumulated a disregard which they would gladly have exchanged for oblivion! In Robert Bridges the public fidelity was loyal to the private, and the withdrawal of his old age was into a sanctuary—a diminution of publicity with addition of influence, for his work lives and will endure.

J. B. PRICE.

## SPENGLER AFTER THIRTY YEARS

THOSE who went up to the University at the end of the 1920's may remember the deep impact made upon some of us by "Der Untergang des Abendlandes" in C. F. Atkinson's translation. As our young world drifted drearily into a depressed decade, we sought and in part found an explanation in this bible of pessimism. Ten years earlier, young Germans, confused and frustrated as they emerged from the defeat had found in it an answer to their searchings. And now after a second and more catastrophic defeat some Germans have been turning to it again. Perhaps more significant, it has found a response in France where, following the misery of the occupation, the traditionally clear atmosphere has been heavily laden with Germanic "Weltschmerz" and "Weltanschauung". Since Spengler wrote what he called "the" philosophy of our time more than thirty years have passed, during which our world has seen the Russian Revolutions, the end of a World War and its aftermath, a World Economic Depression, the Nazi Revolution, and a second World War. And now as we live uncertainly amid a "cold war" and look darkly into the Atomic Age of the future, few would deny there is a crisis, and no one should dismiss summarily the explanation of a man who, whatever his pretentiousness, was possessed of a deep historical insight and imbued with a tragic sense of life. Even those who maintain his work to be largely dross cannot remain blind to its bits of gold. And if we discard his morphology and his theory of culture cycles there still remains an acute prognosis of the crisis of our times. Historians have been severe on him, philosophers hardly less so. But though many have criticised the method and the system, no one has refuted the prognosis, perhaps because it is too early. It may be as well to note his warning that the second half of the twentieth century will see more imperialist wars, the breakdown of parliamentary democracy and further technological advances in the interests, not of human welfare, but of high finance. Only time, and ourselves, can show the validity of these gloomy forebodings.

For Spengler the nineteenth and twentieth centuries mark the stage of exhaustion of our Culture and its hardening into Civilization. With this we enter the period of "contending states", which, as its name implies, is given up to wars of a particularly violent and revolutionary kind. For the very nature of war changes. There is, for instance, the war without war, which Spengler thought began at Versailles in 1919 and which we have seen since Potsdam in 1945. The whole states system is transformed. Instead of a number of states, large and small, each performing in diplomacy and war according to the perfected pattern of the Baroque period, there succeeds a political system wherein each small state is eliminated and becomes a satellite and two or three or perhaps four big states manoeuvre in opposition to each other. This for Spengler is the story of the next hundred years. True, his eyes were so focussed on Europe that he failed utterly to see in the United States, rather than in Prussianised Germany, what for him was the final expression of West European Civilization. As for the Soviet Union, his vision did not comprehend it. Nevertheless, looking morphologically at the Second Century B.C. his penetrating eye picked on a number of features which

will also characterise the struggles of our century. The wars will be fought by the great contending states for the purpose of establishing defensive frontiers. Had he lived he would doubtless have pointed out that what the Soviet Union did in Eastern Europe in 1945 and the United States in the Western Pacific is precisely what Rome did during and after the Second Punic War. For "Imperialism is so necessary a product of civilisation that when a people refuses to assume the role of master, it is seized and pushed into it." Perhaps President Truman was, in this sense, pushed into it when he decided to fight in Korea. If so, General McArthur may go down as the first of the great American pro-consuls in the East, great because he starts a tradition that will tie America's destiny inextricably to Asia. Again Spengler would perhaps have compared the situation in Europe today with that of the Greek City States of the Second Century. For characteristics of both are a sense of exhaustion, war weariness yet continuous strife and party feuds, scepticism, and the utter political failure to unite for a common purpose or against a common foe. There were efforts at integration, but in the end Greece became the battleground between East and West, and unity had to be imposed from without. All "good Europeans" and some not so good could well take note of this. If we want to make the parallel complete, it is necessary only to think of those American Imperialists, who, like the Scipios of old, are convinced that the defence of the United States lies as far off as the Yalu River and the Oder-Neisse line.

Turning now from International to internal politics, Spengler saw in our time parliamentarism in full decay. To his readers immediately after 1918 this may have appeared somewhat rash. For the war had been fought and won "to make the world safe for democracy". Indeed everywhere democratic constitutions were being established, above all in Weimar Germany. To crown all the League of Nations was seen as a Parliament of Mankind. Very soon, however, most of these constitutions were abrogated or destroyed by dictators, and in the 1930's parliamentary government almost everywhere lost prestige before triumphant totalitarian dictatorships. If the French National Assembly remained an important asylum of free speech on the European Continent it lost its hold on public opinion once the venality revealed by the Stavisky scandal led to the riots of 6th February 1934. Even the position of the Mother of Parliaments did not go unchallenged at the hands of leftist intellectuals and trade union militants. The massive majority behind the National Governments did little to inspire great parliamentary leadership or fire the public imagination with a faith in democracy. That had to wait until the bombs rained on London and destroyed the House itself. In that "finest hour" there stood a leader who, with his superb sense of destiny, could defiantly warn those who came on to break parliaments that parliaments would break them, as break them they did. The victory that finally emerged in the West behind Roosevelt and Churchill enhanced the cause of parliamentary democracy. But for how long? Are democrats everywhere vigilant enough and conscious of the need to win the victory anew each generation? Were he alive Spengler would remind us that Churchill is, after all, the last of the great Victorians, while the land of the "New Deal" is today riddled with communists or driven into a frenzy by McCarthy.

The "passing of parliament", which is the subject of a recent work by G. W. Keeton, has given cause for concern to public men and scholars for a generation now. Since Lord Hewart warned of the "New Despotism" in 1929 the enhanced power of the executive arm of government and the practice of delegated legislation have led some to see a trend toward the abandonment of the rule of law and to "bureaucracy triumphant". In the United States there is much talk of the growth of Presidential power and the need to rehabilitate Congress. At this very moment the Bricker amendment seeks to limit Presidential power in foreign affairs. To Spengler parliamentarism is the political form invented by and for the liberal minded bourgeois and it will pass with them. What he does not mention is that principle of government which was introduced by the liberals as the foundations of democracy; the agreement to differ. Unfortunately parliamentarians and the press alike spend so much time on what separates them from their opponents and so little on what unifies them that the public mind is confused and disturbed. Some talented politicians as far apart as Westminster and Canberra, disappointed with their impotence as private members, irked by party discipline, or disgusted with the practice of jobbery and place-hunting, increasingly threaten to resign and leave politics. The calm surface of parliamentary life could quickly be disturbed if political liberalism is further weakened or in the event of another economic depression or a third world war. And as instability deepens in Paris and Rome he would be a bold man indeed who could look around the world today and assert that parliamentary government is safer than in 1918.

When he leaves the political for the economic order Spengler is less sure of himself. His analysis of the function of money and the machine borders on mysticism. The machine is "the queen of our century". But while he extols the coming technological triumphs, he views them not as directed towards human welfare, but as an expression of the Faustian will-to-power. Just as Marx admired the ruthless capitalists of his time, so Spengler admires the managers, the engineers, "those priests of the machine", and, above all, the master minds of the financial kingdom. These types, men of massive intellect, and in no way the masses, will dominate the economic scene. There will certainly be struggles to possess and to harness the material sources of nature, and the welfare of the masses will receive attention insofar as their political support may be useful. But the only real decisions will be made by those with the "know-how" and those with the intellectual power to create money and make it function. Eventually battle will be joined between the machine and money, when science will declare war on plutocracy, its master. Then the invisible body of scientists throughout the world will cry, not "all power to the workers", but "all power to science. For science can and will bring order to the world in its own interest." Much of this may appear fanciful. But we have heard in recent years of the "End of Economic Man" and the "Managerial Revolution". We have seen the whole economy of the "Soviet Fifth" subjected ruthlessly to the domination of a new managerial class. We have seen world trade shrink, mass unemployment grow, and political and social revolution ensue from the decisions or the want of decision of the men of the money market.



We have seen science applied triumphantly to industry and to agriculture, and in consequence an amazing rise in productivity. But with it has gone a tremendous increase in the world's population so that we are once more beset by the Malthusian nightmare. And finally we have seen in Nazi Germany, in New Deal America, and in the British Welfare State revolutions made, not against the state, but within and through the state, using to the full its panoply of power,—directive, technical and financial. The "revolt of the masses" has not then taken the form of the proletarian revolution, which haunted the dreams of the ruling class from 1848 to 1917. Rather it is one of managerial revolution, with technics and capital in the dominant roles, and the mass of humanity looking on, without understanding, and, except in terms of material satisfaction, without hope.

Such was Spengler's picture of our political and economic future, a somewhat gloomy prospect, enough to fill some with apprehension. But need we despair? Much of what Spengler says may be true, but he sees men and events as from another planet. Though this gives him an "objectivity", it denies him the vantage point, and perhaps the gift, to look into the hearts of men. All that goes to make up the infinite variety of men and women does not count for him. It is outside his interest, and therefore irrelevant. Men are types—kings, priests, warriors, plunderers, Caesars or just frogmen and fellahs—and events are predetermined. And just because he is so utterly lacking in charity he is blind to important aspects of human life that do not fit easily into his system. In its essentials his prognosis may prove correct. However, while the rival powers struggle for dominance "on the heights of waking-being" and the Caesar approaches "with firm tread", men on the plains of common living will continue to work and play, to make love and seek beauty, to weave patterns in thought and material, to seek solace in dreams and in prayer. And so it will continue to be until the day comes when some future historical philosopher will in his turn give "Der Untergang" a fixed place in his morphological pattern of the early twentieth century.

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## THE DOUKHOBORS

THERE exists in Canada today a part of the population known as the Doukhobors, who refuse on purely religious grounds to be controlled in certain matters by the Government. These people were first heard of in the early part of the eighteenth century, some seventy years after the appearance of the great Russian schism, the Raskol. The name, short for Doukhobortsy, was originally given to them by the Orthodox Church signifying "fighters against the spirit", and adopted by themselves as meaning "fighters for the spirit". They assign the origin of their sect to a legendary retired Prussian non-commissioned officer, or to a Quaker, and were widely but thinly scattered about Russia. Their religious beliefs are difficult to understand, because they have always been secretive about communicating them in entirety, and not all of them believe the same things all the same time. Moreover, they have no written scriptures, but quote the Bible freely to

justify themselves, though it is not considered to be divinely inspired. Their faith is that the spirit of God is in every human being, and that no man has the right to rule another, especially by violence. Yet they show unquestioning obedience to their theocratic leader, who appears to be accredited with a double portion of the spirit. It is not known how their leader is chosen, though heredity has a good deal to do with it, but not everything. In 1927 Petrovich Verigin came to Canada from Russia to be their leader after the mysterious death in 1924 of his father Peter Vassilyevich Verigin, Peter Vassilyevich had great influence as a public leader, and some regarded him as the Apostles looked upon Christ, while to some he was a God-man, a prophet, and just an ordinary person. Their main belief is that each man must be allowed to decide for himself what he should do, which renders both the government and the church unnecessary and even evil. Some will not kill animals, use or eat them, and many do not smoke or drink strong liquor. It has been known that some have refused to use things made of metal, because this would encourage people to work in the mines or to till the earth, though they are on the whole very good farmers. The belief not to wear clothes has not persisted, but they are apt to take their clothes off in public as a means of protest. They meet in one another's houses, and do not build churches or use ikons. Bread, salt and water are the only symbols displayed, and they bow down to the ground expressive of respect for the spirit of God immanent in everyone when they meet.

Alexander I allowed them to settle near the Sea of Azov in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and nothing was heard at this time of their actually refusing military service, but the hiring of substitutes was then allowed. The thirty elders and twelve "apostles" ruling in the settlement at that time in place of the leader, a weak man who had taken to drink, established a reign of the utmost cruelty. After five years investigation the entire 4,000 of them were transported to the Caucasus in 1841-4 in the hope that they would be wiped out by the wild Mohammedan hill-men. Instead the hill-men admired them, and despite the severe climate the Doukhobortsy succeeded in prospering. It was in 1886 that Peter Vassilyevich Verigin succeeded the then woman leader, who had died. This caused the sect to split and some followed him, but in 1887 he was banished to north Russia, without trial, as a disturber of the peace. However, he was kept well supplied with money and was often in communication with the south, and they obeyed the orders he sent them, one of them being that they were not to perform military service, "since war offends God." They decided therefore to have a ceremonial burning of all weapons on June 29th 1895, but the authorities regarded this as the beginning of an armed rebellion, so the Cossacks attacked and drove them from their homes to be settled among the Georgians and other tribes. This action caused the press of the world to draw attention to their plight, and the followers of Tolstoy and of the Quakers, who regarded them as harmless primitive Christian anarchists, helped about 8,000 of them in 1899 to migrate to Canada, some via Cyprus, where they made an unsuccessful attempt to settle. They settled at and near Yorkton, Saskatchewan and in 1909 some moved to British Columbia. Because of their refusal to furnish vital statistics, it is

uncertain how many there are in Canada today, but a rough estimate is about 20,000 over half of whom live in British Columbia.

On arriving in Canada the Doukhobors had no leader and did not understand the language or the laws of the country; even today they speak Russian, and not all can speak English. Their religious objection to using money, working animals, raising stock and making private property of God's earth made life harder for them. Several times many hundreds set out on a pilgrimage "to meet Christ, to preach the Gospel, and to reach a warm country where there would be no Government, and where they would eat fruit from the trees". It was not for the want of trying that they did not achieve this end for during a Pilgrimage in May 1903 the participants started taking off their clothes as they entered a town or settlement to show that they were as simple as Adam and Eve. However, Verigin, who arrived in Canada in December 1902, discountenanced the Pilgrimage and all other extremes. The Doukhobors regarded the Tsarist Government as evil, and this applied to all Government, so that when they came to Canada they believed that they would be allowed to live without any imposed government. This created a grievance when they discovered that this was not the case. Furthermore, their ideas of property were ambiguous, because in a Russian village community the land was held in common and the council of elders decided what land should be farmed by whom with the belief that private ownership was evil. In Canada they were thus faced with the struggle against wealth and property, so that it became no longer necessary to band together spiritually against oppression. In one direction, this led to the relaxation of the laws of austerity, fraternisation with non-Doukhobors and to prosperity. On the other hand, the more extreme Doukhobors known as the Sons of Freedom, in the Kootenay region, tightened their rules and customs in the name of spirituality and tradition by verbal and physical attacks in an attempt to prevent defection and recall backsliders to their pristine austerity.

Many Doukhobors are still undecided whether they should live communally or as individuals, although the individualists have gained greater prosperity and the community attempts have generally been failures. Under the name of the Christian Community of Universal Brotherhood Ltd. an attempt was made at community ownership in 1926, but this did not prosper, possibly through mismanagement. A small community of about 100 people exists at Hilliers on Vancouver Island, which is said to live communally, even husbands and wives being in common, but this last is denied. Both Federal and Provincial Governments have been given much trouble through the Doukhobors' refusal to supply vital statistics and to comply with the Education Acts, though most of them now conform. The only thing that all the Doukhobors now have the same opinion about is that they will not take an active part in war, but many of them find that if they conform they prosper, and they like prosperity. It is the so-called "fanatics" who create the most trouble. Except for their refusal to comply with the registration laws and the Schools Act, the Doukhobors are desirable settlers for they are devoted to agriculture and general industry. Their protest against sending their children to school has been displayed by burning houses, blowing up

railways and parading naked. The reason for the objection to education is that it tends to break up the sect, showing another and more desirable way of life; and education in English, the registration of births, marriages and death is the thin end of the wedge of conscription. Therefore fire is used as a symbolic purifier to purge out "new ways", to punish those who give way to temptation, as a protest against something vague, and in the burning of one's own property as a joyous personal sacrifice because "property is evil" and "our people are becoming too worldly".

These immigrants have given the authorities trouble ever since they arrived in Canada. There have been "vigilante movements" and police raids, while about 600 Doukhobors on Piers Island in the Gulf of Georgia were convicted of nudism in the segregation of 1932, and in 1950 about 400 men were imprisoned at New Westminster. These men burnt their prison quarters, and were transferred to the main prison. One of the conditions for their release was that they should give a pledge of respect for the Canadian laws, but some of them refused. Moreover, the Doukhobors have brought economic loss to themselves and others through the actual burning of buildings, and because people have stayed away from work to guard their property; and from the general feeling of insecurity which these outbreaks engender. The Sons of Freedom cause the most trouble, but the Canadian Government is unwilling to carry out the suggestions that they should be deported, especially with the memories of the expulsion of the Acadians from Nova Scotia in 1758. Though the Sons of Freedom are willing to emigrate, no country has yet been found to accept them. Furthermore, unless it was possible to segregate them altogether, which seems undesirable after the Piers Island experiment, their relocation in another part of Canada would not solve the problem. However, the Doukhobor Research Committee, which worked under the auspices of the University of British Columbia, recommended in its report of 1952 that there should be a permanent Commission on Doukhobor Affairs responsible to a Minister, appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.

Nevertheless, the problem is a complicated one, because the Doukhobors rely in their purest form on a theocratic leader; if they had one like a practical man such as Peter Vassilyevich Verigin, who was in constant touch with such a Commission, it might be possible for the extreme Doukhobors to continue to live in Canada without being segregated. There is no such leader. The secretary of one sub-sect, the Union of Spiritual Communities of Christ, is John Verigin, great-grandson of Peter Vassilyevich, but he has not the same influence as did his grandfather and great-grandfather. It is believed that when Peter Petrovich was dying in 1939 he referred to a son he had left behind in Russia and who had been sent to Siberia in 1934 for opposing the Communist regime, but advised his followers not to send for him as he would come or send for them when the time is ripe. There is a tradition that the Doukhobors will return to Russia before they find a country where they can settle peacefully. Although the Quakers are looking for this man, it is not known whether he is dead or alive, and for this reason John Verigin cannot assume the leadership of the whole sect. The Sons of Freedom made a public admission of their misdeeds in December 1949.

It is difficult to obtain evidence against them as they will not inform against one another, even if they belong to different sub-sects, but they repented and promised never to repeat them. Yet there was another outbreak in September 1953, when about 150 Doukhobors were charged with nudism and contributing to juvenile delinquency. In the past forty years the Doukhobors have caused damage and incurred costs estimated at \$30 million.

E. H. RAWLINGS.

## NORTHERN NIGERIA

THE present secessions, combinations and crises of Nigerian politics, arising out of the campaign for "Independence in 1956", are bringing the problem of Northern Nigeria before the mind of the informed public to a degree unparalleled since the occupation of that country in 1902. For fifty years Northern Nigeria has been the scene of the most extensive experiment in Indirect Rule in the British Colonies, and, at the same time, has enjoyed a period of such uneventful development that it passed almost completely out of the news until the political advance of the two Southern Regions forced it from its peaceful obscurity. But where news is scant, myth flourishes, and there is a widespread impression of Northern Nigeria as a country in which a number of alien Muslim Emirs exercise despotic rule over a subjugated population, composed partly of fanatical Mohammedans and partly of primitive pagan tribesmen. It is suspected (and with some truth) that the majority of the delegates of the North in the Central House of Representatives are nominees of these Emirs, and it is known that these Northerners are so strongly opposed to immediate Nigerian independence that they have threatened partition of the country, and a reversion to the situation obtaining before 1914, with Northern Nigeria as a separate Protectorate under the British Crown. From these impressions and facts, some observers draw conclusions, ranging, according to political taste, from a belief in the altruistic loyalty of the Northerners to the British, to a suspicion that the Emirs support the British connection as the only support for their position in the face of a discontented and oppressed populace. There is also the feeling that, if the British were to withdraw, the Muslims would "dip the Koran in the sea", having waded through blood to the Gulf of Guinea. This belief has been voiced of other parts of the world. The actual situation seems to be more complicated and less spectacular.

It must first be emphasised that three out of the eleven Provinces of the North are in fact dominated by non-Muslims. Benue, Plateau and Kabba Provinces have wholly non-Muslim representation in the Northern House of Assembly. Four others—Ilorin, Niger, Zaria and Adamawa—have large non-Muslim populations, many of which are not under Emirate rule. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the majority of the population in Ilorin Province is composed of Yorubas, the people who form the dominant majority in the Western Region, and the backbone of the Action Group. Nevertheless, the Muslim population



is large, and that of some of the Emirates impressive; the Muslim population of Kano Emirate is larger than the total population of Southern Rhodesia. Despite the existence of a large non-Muslim minority, Northern Nigeria is a predominantly Mohammedan country. Who and what these Muslims and their rulers are, and what principles they are likely to follow is the fundamental problem of Northern, and indeed of Nigerian, politics. The ruling families of almost all the Emirates are descended from the Fulani, a non-Negro cattle-herding people, and base their right to rule on conquest arising from the Jihad of Usman dan Fodio which began in 1804. Nevertheless, the Fulani families whom the Jihad brought to power in most of the Emirates of what is now Northern Nigeria were very far from being simple cattle nomads. Even at that time they were an aristocracy of town-dwelling learned men and administrators, and a century and a half of rule has almost completely obliterated the differences between them and the Hausa, the predominant Muslim people of the North. In manner, in dress, in customs, in language and in outlook they are indistinguishable from the Hausa, except in so far as a ruling class is necessarily distinguishable from its subjects; and though Fulani descent is still prized as a passport to influence and office, even that is ceasing to be sufficient in a society where Western ideas are opening more and more careers to the talents, and insisting on ever higher qualifications for the traditional positions. In the Muslim Emirates it is quite erroneous to regard the ruling class as alien to its subjects.

A close understanding of his people is a marked characteristic of a Nigerian Emir, and springs from two sources. First, any son or grandson of a former Emir has a claim to succeed to the title. Since the Emirs are polygamous (though adhering to the Koranic maximum of four wives at one time), and are usually prolific, there is always a large number of potential candidates. A man who has accumulated the necessary following and reputation to make a bid for the succession must have proved himself in the lower ranks of the hierarchy to be effective and popular, and also (with the eyes of the British Administration upon him) reasonably efficient and honest. Secondly, the fact that the outward forms of Emirate administration are autocratic should not mislead one into the belief that the content is so also. Northern Nigeria is an area of considerable and continuous movement of population, and every ruler, from an Emir to the headman of a hamlet, is concerned to attract as many people to him as possible, and to forestall any tendency in his people to drift away. An unpopular ruler is in danger of having no subjects. The conservatism of many Emirs is a reflection of the conservatism of their people, and the Emir's question to the District Officer: "When you came to this country you knew that we needed Western education—why did you not then compel us to have it?" is the cry of the ruler who dare not take the responsibility of pressing his people beyond their tolerance. It is rare to find an Emir who does not want his people to advance, but it is also rare to find one who dare proceed with less than the utmost caution in the transformation of their lives.

Educationally, Northern Nigeria is extremely backward when compared with the rest of the country, and it is most noticeable how almost all of the higher Western type appointments in the North are held by

Southerners. The staffs of the Railways, the Post Office and the rest of the Civil Service, as well as of the great trading Companies, are overwhelmingly Southern, principally Yoruba or Ibo, and it is this fact, together with the differences of manners and customs, which makes for the unpopularity of the Southerner in the North. In fact, it is surprising that the unpopularity is as mild as it is. It would be quite misleading to think of it as "fanatical hatred". The Northern Muslim likes alien officials no more than does anyone else, but he is able to tolerate them to a remarkable degree. The fact remains, however, that the North will continue to need foreign technical, clerical and even political assistance for some time to come, and most of this must come from the South; on the other hand, the Northern Muslims would prefer that as much as possible should be furnished by the British, especially in positions of authority. They admit that their own Emirs are not yet fit to rule without supervision, but they cannot envisage any immediately effective alternative within the limits of their own society. Since, for the time being at least, the Emirs must be supervised, they feel it better that the British should do the supervision, by right of conquest, of use and of colour. It is most rare to find a Northern Muslim who would accept supervision of the government of his Emir by another African.

On the other hand, partition is a hardly acceptable solution of the problem. The prosperity and future progress of the North depends on free access to the sea for its products, and a frontier drawn across the country would mean economic strangulation. At the same time, partition would hit the South at least as hard, for it would cut the Southern Regions off from their hinterland, and the increased "Northernisation" of the public services consequent on partition would be a serious blow to many parts of the South which depend for their economic viability on the remittances of their sons in Northern employment. It is to be hoped, and it is not improbable, that the threat of partition is being used by the North as a strong bargaining counter to offset what is regarded as a threat of Southern domination. The most notable characteristic of West African politics which has so far emerged is a curious blend of ferocious oratory with a remarkable capacity for shrewd and generous compromise. It is to be hoped that the present crisis is only another example of the first half of this combination.

PETER DRY.

## THE BLUE DAMSELS

**F**RAIL creatures of the sunshine, they are unquestionably among the daintiest of all living things. On wings so diaphanous as to be almost invisible, they cruise without apparent purpose over the lake-side thickets of sedge and meadowsweet, settling at frequent intervals, changing direction continually, their blue, needle-like bodies glinting like light-beams, not of the sun which is their essential element, but of the moon which they scarcely know. In early summer a favoured stretch of lake-shore may well be astir with scores of these insects, emerged only

recently from their aquatic nymphal stage. They are the commonest of the damsel-flies (*Coenagrion puella*), and this culminating, sun-steeped phase of their existence lasts at most for a few months. Not one will survive the winter, or indeed will make any attempt to do so. By the end of August few will be seen; but all, or almost all by that time, will have fulfilled the object of their being. The females will have laid their eggs among the water-weeds along the margin of the lake, so that, in the fullness of time a new generation of blue damsels may cruise and hover over the forget-me-nots that vie with them in blueness, over the sedges, the watercress and the meadowsweet.

They belong to the same order as the dragonflies, those larger, far more strong-winged insects, among the most superb of flying things. Unless the technical term, *Odonata*, is preferred, they must be called dragonflies, though the name is anything but well suited to such ethereal, fairy-like creatures. But the relationship is beyond question where structure and life-history are concerned. Breeding habits too are closely similar in all members of both sub-orders, particularly the strange attitude adopted for the consummation of the mating process. This indeed is more than strange: it is unique in the whole world of living things. The sex-organs of the female are placed near the end of the long abdomen, and the same is true of those of the male. But his use of these organs is indirect, since for some strange reason, whose origin remains a mystery, he prefers to bring into play a set of pairing-organs on the underside of the second segment of his abdomen, the segment, that is to say, next but one to his thorax. Before mating takes place he transfers the sperm from his sex-organs proper to this specialised pairing-organ, and when this has been done he is ripe for marriage. Consummation is brought about in two stages. In the first the male makes use of yet another set of organs, the claspers, at the far end of his abdomen. With these he takes a firm grip of the narrow neck of the female between her head and her thorax. The second stage is effected by the female who, with what must be a considerable effort, curves her whole abdomen downwards and forwards until the pairing-organ near its tip is in contact with that of the male near the forward end. The bodies of the two of them in this way form a closed ring, though by no means a symmetrical circle. The marriage of the larger dragonflies is not easily witnessed, since the ceremony is often proudly aerial, the male swooping down upon his mate in a glittering parabola and gripping her by the neck. Whereupon the two of them, with a rustle of wings, soar far up among the tree-tops for the consummation of their nuptials in some remote and leafy perch, far above ground level.

With the lowly blue damsels it is quite different. Their flight, though dainty to a degree, is by comparison feeble, taking them no farther than a few feet above the surface of the water, or a few yards beyond its edge. The result is that you may intrude wholeheartedly upon their privacy, witnessing with ease, and without apparent resentment on their part, the most intimate details of their lives, from the initial phases of their courtship, through the completed act of marriage, to the ceremony of egg-laying that follows soon upon it. Choosing conditions of sunshine and windlessness in the month of June, you may take up your position among the waist-high herbage of a favoured lake and settle down for a long and

absorbing vigil. They will be all about you, to all appearances unaware of your presence. It is the males that are blue, barred and streaked with black. The females, less showy as so often among living creatures, are pale yellowish green. Both are so oblivious of human presence, so weak in flight, that it is not difficult to catch them either with the unaided hand, or under a dropped handkerchief. But handle them with the greatest care, for even the most sensitive fingers are too clumsy where such delicate creatures are concerned. Then under a lens you may marvel at the bulbous, china-blue, compound eyes, the complicated mouth-parts, the veining of the wings, and the black pencilling up and down the elongated abdomen.

Meanwhile the business of marrying and of egg-laying is going forward and demands attention. The damsels are on the wing, most of them unpaired, but many in tandem. On leaves of the water-side plants a number of marriages are in the act of being consummated in the manner already described. So absorbed are these coupled pairs that you may peer at them from a range of a few inches and even bring a lens to bear. If disturbed they fly off, still mutually yoked, and choose another perch for the completion of the rite. Those flying in tandem, that is to say where the male has a grip of his mate while she is otherwise free, are in search of a site for the laying of eggs. This demands nicety of choice, though by no means every pair will hit upon a spot of the same kind. Sometimes rafts of the filamentous alga, *Spirogyra*, floating on the surface like tangled masses of bright green cotton-wool, beaded with bubbles of oxygen, will serve. More often leafy stems of forget-me-not or watercress are chosen. In every instance the eggs must be laid in the water, either in the floating raft, or within incisions made in a plant-stem below water-level; and always this egg-laying is an act of partnership, the male playing a subsidiary though important role. Sometimes the female submerges herself bodily, inserting an egg in the tissue of the stem. Sometimes she is content with dipping the end of her abdomen below the surface. While this is going on the business of the male is to assist and sustain his mate, as she ventures, either wholly or in part, into what at this stage in her life-history is an alien element. Often he rears himself bolt upright, rapidly fanning his wings, and so lending her additional buoyancy. This charming co-operative enterprise appears to be the invariable rule among the blue damsels. It governs also the egg-laying of the larger dragonflies, though by no means of all, and in many instances with them the female engages alone and on the wing, dipping her abdomen repeatedly into the water, allowing it to wash off an egg with each dip.

Another characteristic of the nuptial antics of the blue damsels, and perhaps an important one, is the numerical preponderance of males over females. The free-flying damsels, in some places at least, are almost all males. When a female is seen it is nearly always one of a yoked pair. The result is a surprising number of unattached, but by no means contented, bachelors. They cruise about among the mating pairs, clearly showing their jealousy towards their more fortunate brethren by constant intrusion on their intimacy. It seems to be rather the rule than the exception for a pair consummating their wedding, or engaged in co-operative egg-laying, to be attended and pestered by at least one, and sometimes

two, of these resentful bachelors, hovering behind or in front, fanning them with their wings, even butting them in the face. What clearer proof of this preponderance could be needed than the sight, by no means unknown, not of two damsels yoked together, but three, two males and a female. Here the intrusive third cannot fasten his claspers in the neck of the female, since his successful rival is already thus engaged. So what does he do but take a grip of his favoured brother, impressive evidence, if nothing else, of the overmastering urge that prompts him.

What is the significance of this excess of males over females? At first sight it might be supposed that the continual interference of the unattached males must mean that many a marriage is frustrated, many an egg-laying brought to nothing, and the conclusion would seem to follow that this is Nature's device to limit the propagation of the species. It is unlikely that this is the truth. On the contrary we can probably regard it as a device to secure the opposite end, namely the utmost propagation of the species by ensuring the impregnation of as many females as possible. Such a state of affairs is not unknown elsewhere in the world of insects, ants for example, many of whom habitually mate while on the wing. When the great throngs of these insects are assembling in preparation for the marriage flight, the smaller winged males are greatly in excess of the equally winged females.

LESLIE REID.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

### WORLD GOVERNMENT?

THE ideal of world government has again been proposed in those English-speaking circles which have on former occasions been exercised and perplexed by it. This time the occasion was a Pilgrim's dinner given on March 18th last in the joint honour of Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the recently appointed British Ambassador to France and the former British representative at the United Nations, and of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations. It seemed inevitable, on such an occasion and with such speakers, that speculation should be pursued into the roots of the prevailing unrest and of the available remedy, if any. Mr. Hammarskjöld plunged into the middle of things by recalling "the world's hope and need for a world-embracing association of peoples", and elaborated the hypothesis by the remark that "From the point of view of sheer revival, two world wars in 25 years and the threat of much worse disaster if a third world war should come are sufficient evidence of the need for world organisation"; while Sir Gladwyn, out of his abundant experience of the United Nations, gave testimony to the failure of the Security Council as a safeguard of the peace: a failure resulting from its present limitations. He thence deduced the urgency of a better alternative machinery.

It is a natural deduction from the bald facts to suppose that the only alternative to war between sovereign states is some form of common allegiance between States which would deprive them of their sovereignty.



It follows equally naturally in our present era of world war—a product, this, of rapidly expanding scientific knowledge without corresponding moral control—that the notion of world government should for the first time in history fall within the category of practical expedients, or at any rate of realistic discussion to that end. The dividing line between the former scope of aspiration towards a limited or regional fusing together of national governments and the present global conception of a world government was drawn in 1914, the year which more and more stands out as a decisive landmark in history. Even before the world war then started came to the end in November, 1918 of its first phase, *The New Europe*, that august periodical which was started during the war by R. W. Seton-Watson, began a series of articles on the project of a League of Nations, the ideal being roundly summarised in the first of them as “the Parliament of Man”. (*The New Europe*, vol. V. No. 62, December 20th, 1917. p. 294).

It was not the first time in history that the idea had been mooted of taking the sting out of national sovereignty. (The word “sting” was used by Mr. Eden in a House of Commons debate in November 1945 when the topic of discussion was precisely this relationship of national sovereignty with war.) What was new was the sense of urgency about it, and its world-wide scope. A generation ago President Woodrow Wilson took the lead in what became something like a holy crusade for a League of Nations. The last of his Fourteen Points (January 8th, 1918) postulated that “a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike”. The wording of that famous pronouncement illustrated the prevalent muddle in thought that duly vitiated the Covenant of the League of Nations when it was drafted in the following year. It is not indeed “political independence” that gives the clue to international security. It is rather “political inter-dependence”. It is true that independence is a fair call in the rudimentary sense that one nation has no right to subjugate another; but in the fuller sense it would be as intelligent to talk of the independence of one’s right arm from one’s left as to talk of the independence of one nation from another. We are all members of one body politic, dependent upon each other.

Woodrow Wilson himself had in part clarified his own mind a little later when (July 4th, 1918) he propagated “four ends” of a peace settlement, of which the third read thus: “The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honour and of respect for the common law of civilised society that govern the individual citizens of all modern states, and in their relations with one another, to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right”. As a still further step in the progress of his own clarification he enumerated “five particulars” in his specification for peace (September 27th, 1918) of which the third spoke of “the general and common family of the League of Nations”. The word “family” gives the clue to good sense in this matter.

It happened that the formal Covenant of the League of Nations was duly agreed at Versailles and incorporated as an integral part of the treaty of peace that was signed on June 28th, 1919. And it happened that the instrument utterly and irremediably failed, as a means of binding the nations together in the mutual cause of peace and commonsense. And then, after a second phase of world war, it happened, as it were for the second time of asking, that the Charter of the United Nations was agreed and signed at San Francisco on June 26th, 1945. A quarter of a century had passed, and a virtually second attempt was being made to bind the nations into mutual security and peace. It failed, even more spectacularly than the first attempt failed. By March 18th of the present year that second failure was so well established that at the Pilgrims' dinner above referred to Sir Gladwyn Jebb could put it in this way: "It is clear that, for so long as the cold war continues, the Great Powers are quite unlikely to be unanimous. Therefore, we must regretfully conclude that the Security Council cannot at present be relied upon to cope with any aggression other than a minor one in which the interests of the Great Powers are not engaged. Until such time as we arrive at what in effect will be a World State—and that will be a long time yet—we have just got to realise that the Security Council, action by which was rather optimistically presupposed at San Francisco to be possible given a "minimum of harmony" between the Great Powers, is useless as an instrument for dealing with any serious aggression".

At a first glance (but happily that need not be the last) it looks as if, on the experience of the first half of the twentieth century, the ideal of world government must remain an ideal: must, that is, be recognised as practically unattainable within a measureable future. Mr. Hammarskjöld indeed went so far on March 18th as to propound the thesis that "the diversity of the nations made world government impossible", but added the apt corollary that "the inter-dependence of the nations has made world organisation necessary". If President Wilson's word "independence", used in 1918, has by 1954 been rejected in favour of Mr. Hammarskjöld's truer word "inter-dependence" as the keynote of political thought on this subject, then something at least has been gained, a step has been taken in the right direction.

On a cursory view it may seem a little depressing to notice that substantial progress towards any ideal is seldom apparent in this transitory life. But on more mature reflection it becomes apparent that chaos is an almost essential element in the circumstance of man's individual progress towards his appointed destiny. If one happened to be born into a world where the lion lay down the lamb, and where the national governments of the world ceased to behave towards each other like complete idiots, it is at least arguable that the human soul would be crippled by an atrophy of its intended exercise: as J. K. Stephen once put it,

"When there stands a muzzled stripling,

Mute, beside a muzzled bore:

When the Rudyards cease from Kipling

And the Haggards Ride no more?"

Indeed it is one of the perennial sources of human paradox, a paradoxically comforting mystery, to notice that the human individual, that is, a soul

created by an omnipotent God, whose omnipotence is manifested in love without measure, rides the storms of this earthly life and is not dismayed. The devil himself, it seems, is permitted to do his devilish worst for an ultimately good purpose: how else could God permit him to operate at all? In international affairs the devil enjoys an unending field-day.

As these lines are written, the world in its political aspect looks like one large cockpit of purposeless strife, involving the shedding of innocent blood, the waging of unnecessary vendettas, the general massacre of decency and of normal good fellowship among men. This is a remarkable thing, a big thing, a challenge. The fighting men who at the place in Indo-China we call Dien Bien Phu (although no such town any longer exists) or in the Aberdare forests of Kenya are concentrated blindly on killing as many of each other as they can; the quarrelling politicians who in Cairo or Moscow or—the irony of it—in Jerusalem, are concentrated as blindly on fomenting bad blood: these men, as individual men, no doubt lead a contrastingly ordinary, normal, sensible and good life as husbands, sons, brothers. What is interesting is the apparently irreconcilable sort of motive that operates at the two extremes of man's activity: the private and the public. In the private life of individuals, the devil, it is true, is unceasingly at work, but the grace of God is the decisive thing. In public life, it looks as if the grace of God is inoperative and the devil walks over unresisted. What is it that explains the discrepancy between the private and the public functioning of the same person?

The answer is obvious. A man as an individual is directly and undilutedly responsible to his conscience for what he does. He seems to lose or at least in part to shed his sense of responsibility when he becomes a cypher in an organisation, or a cog in a wheel. In other words it is the sense of spiritual values transcendentalising the materialist circumstance, that alone keeps a man on the lines. Yet the mediaeval conception of a universal Church ruled by the Pope and a universal State ruled by the Emperor, together binding mankind into a balanced unity, and constituting something akin to what the World State now talked of ought to be, spent itself without effect, no doubt because man was not yet ready for so big a step forward. Similarly the League of Nations Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, the Locarno Treaty (which logically implied a limitation of the sovereignty of the four Western European Powers, Britain, France, Italy and Germany, because it deprived them of the power to declare war upon each other except in the condition prescribed by the treaty) and the Charter of the United Nations, all in their turn over a period of a quarter of a century spent themselves without effect.

It seems therefore to be an established truth that there can be no progress towards world government unless and until this snag of national sovereignty be dealt with. The Charter of the United Nations, that latest attempt at a world organisation, was vitiated from the start by the retention of full sovereignty by the Great Powers. It was retained by the instrumentality of Article 27, which gave to each permanent member of the power of veto over the others. Since the days when Aristotle discussed the nature of sovereignty in the Greek "city-state", there has been no end to the like discussion in reference to more modern States, and no beginning of an inkling of a solution of the problem involved.

On May 7th, 1946, when Mr. Churchill was given the freedom of the City of Westminster, and was fêted for his "glorious leadership", "unmatchable example", "stirring words", etc., he himself, while acknowledging the honour conferred on him, was full of doubt and anxiety for the future. "What happens" he asked "if the United Nations themselves are sundered by an awful schism and clash of ideologies, interests, policies and passions? What happens if, with all our loyal endeavour, we can build no more than a Tower of Babel?" He dwelt wistfully upon "the noble task of building and maintaining an all-powerful, world-governing instrument to preserve freedom and to prevent war". They all yearn for it. Mr. Ernest Bevin on November 23rd, 1945 in the debate mentioned above, declared "I am willing to sit with anybody, of any party, of any nation, to try to devise either a franchise, or a constitution—just as other great countries have done—for a world assembly, with a limited objective—the objective of peace". It was in that same debate (which took place in the House of Commons on November 22nd and 23rd, 1945—on the morrow of "victory") that Mr. Eden cried out from his depths: "For the life of me I have been unable to see, and am still unable to see, any final solution which will make the world safe for atomic power save that we all abate our present ideas of sovereignty."

It was a remarkable thing that towards the close of 1945 the British House of Commons should sincerely and realistically debate such a topic as the connection of national sovereignty with world tension, Mr. Bevin urging what he called the "merging" of national sovereignty into a wider sovereignty, Mr. Churchill urging a partial surrender of sovereignty, and Mr. Eden a revision of our former conceptions of sovereignty. Mr. Bevin went on to envisage in so many words "a world assembly, elected directly from the people of the world as a whole for whom the governments who form the United Nations are responsible, and who in fact make the world law which they, the people, will then accept, and be morally bound and willing to carry it out." Bad grammar, good sense. It is not an accident that this talk of modifying, surrendering, or taking the "sting" out of national sovereignty should take place at the beginning of the atomic age. The atomic bomb, and still more the hydrogen bomb, has cast a potent shadow over the world. More and more people who have developed the habit of simple logical thought (including Sir Winston Churchill) have expressed the opinion that this new bomb may well have the effect of putting an end to war. War results from the mutual fear of competitive armed nations. A greater common fear, the fear of impartial universal destruction, may drive out the smaller.

A never ceasing stream of new evidence accumulates about this unspeakable new bomb. The spectacular "test" of its explosive power having taken place on March 1st last, when the United States authorities staged it at Bikini in the Pacific, President Eisenhower in his Press conference on March 24th, was constrained to remark that something must have happened that scientists had never experienced before; something that must have surprised and astonished them. For it happened that the explosion of the hydrogen bomb on that occasion was so far more powerful than the scientists had expected that it could not be accurately measured

on the instruments at their disposal. Buildings had been shaken 176 miles away, a nuclear cloud had been thrown up 17 miles high and 28 miles wide, islanders living 150 and 160 miles away from the scene of the explosion had had to be evacuated from their islands because they had been affected by the radiation, and could not be allowed to return to their homes until heavy rain had washed away the radioactive material; and 23 Japanese fishermen, fishing some 150 miles from the scene of the explosion, had been contaminated by the cloud of radioactive dust and taken to hospital in Tokyo. Professor Oliphant, vice-chancellor of the National University in Melbourne, declared on March 25th that the hydrogen bomb exploded at Bikini on March 1st was a mere "baby", that the Americans undoubtedly had "bigger and better ones"; but that there would be no danger to Australia from future tests of these "monsters" unless the American scientists should make what he called "scientifically impossible" mistakes in handling them. He added that in view of the apparent mistakes made by the scientists on March 1st they would be certain to be "100 per cent." careful in the future. He went on to give the staggering information that the characteristic quality of the hydrogen bomb was that it was "absolutely unlimited in size", that its destructive power could not be exaggerated, that it had "fifty million times" (whatever that may mean) the force of the atomic bomb and "four hundred times the destroying radius".

He put a rider to that tale of woe by expressing the opinion that the apparent curse was a blessing in disguise, because in his opinion the best safeguard against a third world war was the fact that man knew that he could not get away with it without destroying himself. Only twenty four hours earlier Lord Salisbury had said in the British House of Lords, on the subject of the hydrogen bomb: "We must accept that fearful weapon not as a nightmare of the future but as a hideous reality of today. That does not mean that war is nearer. It ought to mean that world war will be henceforth impossible."

If such a belief were to spread fast enough, it would itself go some way towards solving the problem of international tension and even of world government. The present "sting" of nationalism is that of national power resting on national armaments directed through national sovereignty. If the possibility of war were removed from men's minds by the overriding fear of hydrogen bombs, then the manufacture of armaments, the existence of armies, navies and airforces would all overnight become things of the past. Miracle is of an overwhelming perfection in its achievement. The disappearance through disuse of national armaments would involve the disappearance of national sovereignty, for which in its turn there would no longer be any use. World government in effect might descend upon an astonished humankind as naturally as the gentle rain from heaven. Common welfare would be the common aim, unimpeded by fear. The prospect in such a sense was described in the Foreign Affairs section of the Contemporary Review of January 1946: "The only effective alternative to national sovereignty as a magnet of allegiance in world affairs is the oblation of ourselves in allegiance and love to God our common Father, whence would follow as an essential consequence the sovereignty of mutual good will among men and peace on earth."



## A NOTE ON GIBRALTER

"The Rock", as it is somewhat affectionately known in our country, now protrudes prominently in Anglo-Spanish affairs. An article published in the *Times* of January 28th last from its Gibraltar Correspondent began with these words: "Spanish claims for the Rock of Gibraltar, until recently largely confined to hysterical outbursts by students and members of Falangist youth movements, have now become officially sponsored. They have even produced two Ambassadorial protests against the visit of the Queen next May". Little is gained by ignoring the bitterness of feeling that increasingly characterises these outbursts of Spanish students in Madrid and elsewhere. General Franco has himself lately stated in public that Spain has "never accepted" British ownership of Gibraltar. Now it is a commonplace fact, well known to the diplomats, that in such matters treaty rights weigh little in the balance by comparison with racial and national emotion and prejudice. In Spain they simply argue that it is no more fitting for Britain to own Gibraltar than it would be for Spain to own Dover; and they are bored or exasperated by the historical argument such as was excellently summarised by a letter published in the *Times* of February 3rd last, from Dr. Randolph Hughes. The treaties of Utrecht (1713), of Seville (1729) and of Versailles (1783) are normally quoted in our country as constituting the British legal claim, freely granted by Spain in return for benefits received, to Britain's possession of the Rock. But no realist person imagines that the problem is thereby disposed of. It is one of the bitterest as well as potentially most important of contemporary disputes. In the prevailing circumstance of communist aggression and the incidental communist designs upon strategic points in the Mediterranean the problem is of a baffling complexity. Moscow has already been denied access to the Mediterranean through Trieste and the Adriatic as a result of Yugoslavia's defection from the Cominform. Would it not be possible for Spain, staunch defender of Western Christianity as she is, to accept an *ad hoc* understanding with Britain about the importance of the Rock as a bastion of their common defence, and indeed of Western defence in the widest sense?

April 12th, 1954.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

## LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## PLANS FOR PERMANENT PEACE

German historians have often excelled in that difficult branch of their discipline which deals with the history of ideas, and Professor von Raumer in this important book\* has made a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the genesis and development of the ideal of permanent peace in European society. The book, which forms part of a series of works on political thought, is written in the best tradition of Friedrich Meinecke, Ernst Troeltsch, and Ferdinand Tönnies. It is divided into two parts of which the first forms a penetrating dissertation on the development of the ideal of perpetual peace as set out in the writings of Erasmus, Sebastian Franck, Sully, Crucé, Penn, Bentham, Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant and Gentz. The second part contains reprints of the writings

of these authors on the theme of peace some of which have for a long time been virtually inaccessible to the general reader. The book, therefore, is of the greatest value to anybody who would like to study the growth of the ideas which ultimately led to the establishment of the League of Nations and UNO. It is particularly gratifying that, unlike the case of most works of a similar character, the writings used for documentation here have been reproduced as fully as possible and as far as could be judged the translations from French and English are adequate and lively.

The author does not claim to have written a comprehensive history of the intellectual attempts made by European thinkers to come to terms with the problem of war and peace. He wisely contents himself with using the authors of his choice, who undoubtedly were also the most important spokesmen in this field, as it were as representatives of the intellectual trends and currents of their time. In doing so he has not only managed to give an absorbing account of the changes in the intellectual climate of Europe from the Humanism of Erasmus to the Idealism of Kant and the somewhat disillusioned realism of Gentz with his trust in a balance of power system, but he has also given valuable material to the political historian. Although most of the ideas and proposals set out in these writings have never actually influenced political events directly, the climate in which they grew was of course the same which shaped European politics, and the general reader cannot help feeling that his understanding of the complex traits of European history has both been widened and deepened by studying these ideas which have so often been thrust aside as utopian and irrelevant by the professional historian. It might also come as something like a revelation to many that the movement for peace was a genuinely European movement, and that men participated in it who were as widely different in outlook and tradition as were the Dutchman Erasmus and the Prussian Kant. Kant's treatise, which is perhaps the most important contribution to the subject, is in fact as important and relevant today as it was when it was first published. In spite of the limitations which the author sets himself it is regrettable that the book stops at about 1800. After all it was in our own century that the first attempts have been made to translate the ideas so learnedly expounded and analysed in this book into practice, however ineffectual this translation may have been. Perhaps the author felt that he could not take his story to recent times in the absence of a modern Rousseau or Kant to give us guidance in our own struggle for peace.

DR. REINHOLD ARIS.

\**Ewiger Friede.* By Kurt von Raumer. Karl Albert, Freiburg, Munich.

### RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM IN THE FAR EAST

Most of the numerous books on Soviet Russia contain little or no information about the Soviet Far East, and in consequence practically nothing is known in the West about this sparsely populated but extensive part of the world which in recent years has become even more important as the result of the communist victory in China. Mr. Kolarz, the author of *Russia and her Colonies*, in this new book fills a gap in our knowledge, and although his account is not first hand it is based on Russian sources and is carefully documented. Some of the stories, e.g., his account of the downfall of that enigmatic creator of the Far Eastern Russian Army, Marshall Blukker, have probably never been told before in Western literature and are of absorbing interest to the student of world affairs.

The book is written in a studiously objective manner, and the author successfully avoids the passionate partisanship so common in books on Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, despite his impartiality, or perhaps because of it, the author

manages to convey an almost frightening indictment of Russia's colonial policy which fits in only too depressingly well with our knowledge of her imperialist policy towards her European satellites. It is one of the greatest ironies of history that the leaders of a country which prides itself on being in the forefront in the fight against imperialism and colonial exploitation should themselves be responsible for a policy of ruthless suppression of national and racial minorities and of a complete disregard for the most elementary human rights which surpasses almost anything done by other colonial powers. Mr. Kolarz gives a detailed account of the various forms of this exploitation, the use of slave labour for forceful colonisation, the expulsion of Japanese, Chinese and Korean minorities, the destruction of tribal and religious institutions and countless other manifestations of imperialism in action. The picture of Russia's colonial policy in her Far Eastern territories that emerges from this book is not only extremely crude but also rather confused. We gain the impression that the European masters of these Asiatic tribes are themselves, in spite of all their training in Marxian dialectics, by no means clear about the way in which their primitive colonial subjects fit into the communist pattern. The result of this uncertainty is a constantly changing policy of decree and counter-decree, purge and counter-purge, which in spite of the material advantages it may have brought to these backward and incredibly primitive parts of Asia has been far more cruel than anything the white man ever did in Africa. It remains to be seen whether the author is right when he asserts that Russia in her Far Eastern policy is impaled on the horns of a dilemma; because if she continues her policy of European supremacy she will inevitably come into conflict with China and possibly Japan, and if she admits Chinese and other racial groups on a basis of equality she will ultimately lose her territories. This of course is an attractive thesis to Western ears, but we know that the East has a way of confounding the experts and it may well happen that Western materialist communism, which is utterly alien to the Eastern mind as the author rightly insists, will adapt itself to Asiatic needs and conceptions.

DR. REINHOLD ARIS.

*The Peoples of the Soviet Far East.* By Walter Kolarz. George Philip & Son Ltd., 15s. 6d.

## THE SECOND BRITISH EMPIRE

The great merit of this book lies in Professor Harlow's determination to relate events to ideas, not spasmodically and at large but continuously and in detail. No book so massive can be or ought to be light reading. But this book affords enjoyable and instructive reading throughout because one is never allowed to lose touch with the central theme. That theme is the development and effects of a reconsideration of the purposes of colonies. This reconsideration, which antedated the outbreak of the American Revolution by a decade, was based on a "revulsion against colonisation"—taking colonisation to mean the foundation and extension of settlements peopled predominantly by emigrants, or the descendants of emigrants, from Britain. Compared with such men as Cecil Rhodes or Kipling the Englishman of the mid-eighteenth century was a prosaic, money-grubbing soul. Living before the humanitarian and romantic movements he saw little attraction *per se* in an empire which stretched from palm to pine or in assuming the white man's (or any other avoidable) burden. He sought tangible results from the employment of specific assets. The greatest of these assets was what would be called today the "industrial potential" of Britain, and the emigration of artisans would diminish it. The settlements which those artisans formed or strengthened might become economically competitive or politically recalcitrant: at the best they would demand a vast and costly amount of administrative effort which would never show an adequate return in hard cash.

What was the alternative? "To find a vent for the widening range of British manufactures by creating a network of commercial exchange extending through the Pacific and Indian Oceans . . . a chain of trading posts, protected at strategic points by naval bases" (pp. 3, 4). In his first four chapters Professor Harlow describes, in fascinating detail, the efforts to this end, including those which aimed at developing trade with China and Japan by creating emporia in the Malay Archipelago. As he reminds us, this was being done while the controversy with the American colonies was still in its initial phases.

There was the crux of the difficulty. An empire which was a collection of trading posts might be desirable but, in hard fact, the British empire as it stood was a great deal more than that. Massachusetts might be burdensome in comparison with Sumatra or the Celebes but it was nevertheless the dominating reality at the given moment: as always, the future—the glittering future of infinite possibilities with a minimum of expense—was bound to the present and the past. No set of men in high office could afford itself the luxury of looking wholly in one direction, and British statesmen had to take into account Samuel Adams as well as James Cook. So far as Professor Harlow allows himself to have a hero the hero is Shelburne; the statesman at the utmost range of contemporary thought who yet had to deal with the present and the past and who attempted in one supreme effort, in the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles, to provide for the future. It was only with the most extreme reluctance that Shelburne abandoned his plans for some form of Anglo-American federalism. His mind, vast and fertile and essentially humane, had its limitations: he failed to "come to terms with the human species" (p. 445), British politicians or American nationalists. The impression which he made on the French envoy, Rayneval, was a major contribution towards the peace settlement; it was not the impression of nationalism on nationalism but of one mind upon another; the flower and perhaps the justification of an oligarchical age. But Pitt declined to admit Shelburne to his cabinets: the disinterested intellect could be a political liability.

It would be unfortunate if this book were to be regarded as a proper study for students of imperial history but for no one else. It is far more than that. The basic problem which it exhibits is that of the reaction of the mind to facts, circumstances and probabilities. The possibilities of remedial action were not limitless—they never are—and they were further bounded by what was politically practicable. Nor was the "Second Empire," in the event, to be a mere collection of trading posts. As the movements for the abolition of slavery and for colonial self-government proved, more fundamental responsibilities could not be shelved so easily. Possibly the best tribute to Professor Harlow's book is that it makes the reader anxiously conscious of the difficulties inherent in the government of human beings.

PROFESSOR W. L. BURN.

*The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793, Vol. 1, Discovery and Revolution.* By Vincent T. Harlow. Longmans. 45s.

### STEFAN GEORGE AND HOFMANNSTHAL

In December 1891 the 23 year old Stefan George sought the acquaintance of the 17 year old Hugo von Hofmannsthal in a Vienna Coffeehouse. Shortly before his death the Austrian poet described the event in a letter to a friend. "Without any intermediary George approached me; as I sat late at night in the Café, reading an English periodical, a man of very marked appearance with a proud passionate expression (a man who seemed to me much older than myself, perhaps nearly thirty years of age) said to me, that he had read one of my essays, and that what he had heard about me, seemed to indicate that I was among the few people in Europe (and here in Austria the only one) with whom he had to

establish contact: it was a matter of uniting those who could fathom the nature of poetry." That was the beginning of a momentous connection which was to last intermittently until 1906 and whose vicissitudes can be closely followed in this final edition of the correspondence. It appears that after a stormy beginning the passionate friendship between the two poets came to an abrupt end, owing to too great a diversity of temperament, though it lingered on for some fourteen years. For George this meant the crushing of a hope which all but broke him; for he perceived in the precocious Austrian boy the prototype of that "disdainful, penetrating and refined intelligence", that superior being, for which he was looking all over Europe and which he had now met for the first time within the confines of German-speaking lands. There can be no doubt that Hofmannsthal was equally attracted and revolted by the overpowering presence of the German poet, and subsequently withdrew into his shell as a means of self-protection and preservation.

The deep disappointment to which George gave vent, in a newly found document, with the elemental force of tragic confession was answered by Hofmannsthal in moving words of youthful dedication, to which he yet lacked the strength and the will. "I can only give myself", he wrote on January 10th, 1892, "I can do no other. My being pours forth the wine of its young life. . . . He who can, takes. I believe that one man can be much to the other: torch, key, seed, poison . . . but I see no guilt and no merit where Tyche alone is mysteriously at work. . . . I wished I could hold you to render thanks for the depths you have shown me; but you like to stand where you shudder and proudly love the abyss which few can see." But none of this came to fruition. Throughout the correspondence George appears as the wooer, the ruling spirit, whose work and person the Austrian poet cherishes with a strange mixture of admiration and fear. Ten years after their first meeting George revealed the true nature of his hopes and intentions with an astounding bluntness of purpose, from which the Austrian poet, perhaps justifiably, shrank. In July 1902 George wrote: "I was of the firm opinion that we—you and I—could exercise in our literature a very wholesome dictatorship for years to come. That this did not materialise, for that I must hold you alone responsible."

Though George so urgently wanted to enlist the only other considerable force in German letters besides his own in the crusade that he was waging for the purity of art and of life against the ravages of naturalism and rampant vulgarity in the Germany of Hauptmann and of Dehmel, he does not appear in these letters solely as the ambitious and overtowering lawgiver who would brook no other way of life but his own and that of his devoted followers. In many a letter to Hofmannsthal he reveals such warmth of sympathy, such generous acknowledgement of the younger poet's genius, such deep understanding of his personal and national predicament, that it is surely one of Hofmannsthal's great tragic failures to have rejected such partnership for the sake of his own theatrical successes and the lesser human and literary associations. Already by 1897 George had abandoned some of his original severity towards the friend. He makes allowance for Hofmannsthal's different way of feeling and upbringing. He excuses him on account of the "incomprehensible distraughtness" of his mind. He declares his unceasing love, based upon admiration, and pays the highest tribute to his art. Yet fate had not willed their united kingship. The Austrian poet drifted farther and farther away from the steep and uncompromising path of George, until in one of the last utterances to Hofmannsthal he must confess his sorrow that "there hardly seems to exist a single point where we do not misunderstand one another."

F. M. GODFREY.

*Briefwechsel zwischen George und Hofmannsthal.* Verlag Helmut Kupper, Munchen und Dusseldorf.



## THE BURNING GLASS

To put the matter temperately, the English stage is hardly flourishing. Slowly, with up-hill concentration, an Eliot and a Fry have attained a position high on the slopes of dramatic achievement. And there, alone, off the beaten track of theatrical labours, they shine apart. Below them—thousands of feet below—their lesser colleagues make their bid for fame. Their reward—a noisy indiscriminating applause. If we ask the reason for this disparity, the answer perhaps is that the more popular playwrights seem afraid of seriousness, both in language and in situation. No such preliminary disadvantage attends on Mr. Charles Morgan's third play, *The Burning Glass*. Indeed, its theme is of such moment as to warrant, in the manner of Shaw and his *Prefaces*, an introductory essay *On Power over Nature*, which strikes me as the best thing in this new work. The substance of *The Burning Glass* is the haphazard discovery by a British meteorological scientist of a means by which the sun's heat can be focussed on any part of the earth's surface. The possibilities of applying this knowledge for beneficial or destructive purposes are theoretically equal; but—awake to the conscience of governments—the scientist knows which use will be promoted. He resolves therefore to communicate the formula to no one save his wife, and to place it at the disposal of his country only in the case of emergency against a totalitarian power. But before security methods to protect him have been put into operation, he is abducted by enemy forces. An ultimatum is delivered by the British Government, but one minute before it expires the scientist is returned by plane to his own home. The secret formula has not been learnt by the hostile states and so the vexed peace of the cold war continues. As a drama of ideas, *The Burning Glass* is not without a certain suggestive value. "The time may come—has come, perhaps—", one of the characters concludes, "in which science will be seen again as a source of wisdom, not of power. . . . Isn't it possible that the whole era of Power for Power's sake is near its end?" But a play must be more than a stimulating thesis: it must humanly (even as intellectually) convince; and this *The Burning Glass* fails to do. To me it seems that the characters are either idealised (the scientist, his wife, and mother), or villainised (the foreign agent) out of all likely recognition. This leaves us with a Prime Minister, who might have come out of a work by Oscar Wilde, and a neurotic ex-R.A.F. type. Judged by most plays now running in London, *The Burning Glass* is adult entertainment. Alas, that criterion is not itself adult.

DEREK STANFORD.

*The Burning Glass*. By Charles Morgan. Macmillan 9s. 6d.

## THE QUAKER APPROACH

This very interesting book deals with the many problems in the world today, which challenge Friends to thought and action. If Quakerism is a way of life, it must be concerned with the whole of it, and the writers cover very widely differing subjects, including the well-known antagonism to all war, the practical work of relieving its results, industrial and economic problems, prisons, punishment and race relations. It is the English edition of an American book, so is written mainly from the American viewpoint.

Quakers' activities, varied as they have been, have been both extended and limited by their faith. "In the Quaker Society, religion, instead of being the conservative, traditional force which it usually is, became a radical, revolutionary instrument, tearing men away from the mere acceptance of tradition, to a rediscovery of the fountain of truth itself, in the hearts and minds of men." (Page 48). They did not accept authority, either of Church or Bible, but

sought it in the divine Inward Light in their hearts, which led them to an experimental religion.

"Quakers believed," as Rufus Jones has put it, "that the relations between God and man is direct, energising, vital, and transforming, and as much a matter of experience and verification as sunlight." (Page 167).

This led them to be pioneers, innovators and reformers in many directions. On the other hand their activities were restricted by their principles, the Army, Navy and many professions being closed to them.

Science and medicine have always attracted Quakers, and it is a curious fact, mentioned by Prof. Kathleen Lonsdale in her chapter on Science, that statistics during the last 150 years, show that a man or woman—Quaker or of Quaker birth—has 20 to 30 times the chance of election as an F.R.S. that others have.

The article by Roger Wilson on "Relief and Reconstruction" deals with the requirements and difficulties of good team work, and details some of those encounters when association with Government agencies is required. It is a pity that in his outline of earlier Quaker relief he omits to mention that, in the First World War, Anglo-American joint relief was initiated, and large scale work carried out in 9 countries, during 9 years. For this, at one time, money at the rate of £1,000 per diem was being received in London. Neither here, nor in the later most interesting chapter on Quakers' connection with Russia, is there any account of the Famine Relief in the Samara district in 1922-3, when there were 900 feeding points in the British area of work, and a very large number of lives were saved. This chapter tells how many contacts there have been between Quakers and Russia, since George Fox wrote to the Emperor Alexis I in 1656; and though we must not overestimate the influence of Quakerism on Russia, it is curious that Stephen Grellet and William Allen, in the early nineteenth century, found Barclay's Apology, the great Quaker classic, being used by a section of the Orthodox Church, and the recent pamphlets by American Friends on better relations between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. "were well read East of Berlin." (Page 231).

The chapter on Race Relations is important as showing the recent advance in American Quaker thought and action on the matter. There had been a quiescent period since the days of John Woolman, and "it was only the continuing, impassioned, concerns of individual Friends during this period that kept the approaches of the Society of Friends from becoming more than a matter of historical record." (Page 97).

Then, in 1949, came an important statement on segregation, and now there seems no question about Negro membership in Friends' Meetings, and an American Negro physician headed the American Medical Mission among Arabian refugees in Palestine.

The book is too full of interesting matter for it to be possible to summarise in this short review—it is well worth reading, but it is a great pity there is no index.

A. RUTH FRY.

*The Quaker Approach to Contemporary Problems.* Edited by John Kavanaugh. Allen & Unwin. Price 15s.

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In *The Lamartine Ladies*, (Macdonald) Mrs. Laura Ragg describes learnedly and lengthily the Lamartine domestic scene. The gay Romantic was born into the privileged in 1790 and grew up with traditions of behaviour that welcomed the Restoration, "for the Kingdom of God would again be born". He entered the crack Garde du Corps, sought safety in Switzerland during the Hundred Days, and then the patronage that secured him diplomatic posts. He embodied the emotions of the post-revolutionary generation which rebelled against the

eighteenth century deification of reason, and in his *Meditations*, 1830, he launched the lyricism that captured the age. The Romantics were not contemplative. Lamartine entered the Assembly and his *Histoire des Girondins* marked a legitimist's pilgrimage to people's governance, little dreaming that he was preparing the way for a Mock Napoleon, for France was still Caesarean. He was caught in "the hot fury of the Seine" in 1848 and only saved the Republic by his lyrical appeal to the red bonneted mob. "The Red Flag has but made the round of the Champ de Mars. The Tricolor has encircled the globe". It was not the only time that a flag decided France's destiny. He failed to secure the Presidency and, burdened by his extravagant generosity, he was forced to sell his family patrimony, "work like a galley slave to the pen", and accept a pension from a Napoleon. He died in 1869 before having to mourn the great defeat. Throughout his turbulent life there shines the love and tenderness of his home. His devoted mother reared him in piety, his English wife Mary Anne Birch tenderly partnered his work, and when she departed his homely niece provided comfort. They are gracious ladies who built the edifice of affection and peace within which his genius could flower. Mother-devotion and wife-love are eternal without which life would flicker away. Modernism, however, has distorted their contours. What is striking is the changed claims of the hearth. The fulcrum of this scholarly book is the mother who holds that "women should enter marriage as into an Order. When she marries, she takes vows, a vow of Poverty since she puts her fortune into the hands of her husband; a vow of Obedience to him; a vow of Chastity since she must henceforth seek to be pleasing to no other man. She vows herself to Charity towards her husband, her children and household, to the duty of tending them in sickness and of teaching them to the best of her ability". The Lamartine ladies kept their vows lovingly.

VICTOR COHEN.

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In *Glyn's* 1753-1953 (Macmillan, 21s.) Mr. Roger Fulford has written an interesting and valuable history of Glyn Mills & Co., the last of the great private banking houses in Lombard Street. On January 5th, 1754, the three original partners opened their commercial bank with a capital of £24,000 and a few clerks. After a short failure in the financial panic of 1772, the business steadily prospered until in 1939 it had a balance sheet of nearly £80 millions and a staff of 750. Much of the book is devoted to the financial and political careers of the leading partners who, in the course of developing their business, contributed in a marked degree to the development of British economic strength in the nineteenth century. For example, Mr. Fulford discusses in some detail the Bank's part in financing the construction of the London and Birmingham railway and in promoting Canadian development in the 1830's. As the last century progressed the private banks were threatened more and more by the competition of the great Joint Stock Banks. It is a remarkable tribute to the ability of the partners that Glyn's not only remained independent, but continued to prosper until the second world war. In 1939 the complications of death duties in the event of the young partners being killed, and "the unpredictable character of those times," induced the partners to sell their capital to the Royal Bank of Scotland. It is an inspiring story which has a real place in the economic history of the last two centuries.

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